The effect of strike action on the value and volatility of the South African Rand by Gordon, Ross Patrick
THE EFFECT OF STRIKE ACTION ON THE VALUE AND VOLATILITY OF  
THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAND 
 
 
A half-thesis submitted for the partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of: 
 
 
MASTER OF COMMERCE (FINANCIAL MARKETS) 
Of 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
 
By 
ROSS PATRICK GORDON 
 
February 2015 
 
Supervisor: Mr Ferdi Botha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
Except for those references acknowledged in the text, this thesis wholly represents my own work and 
no part has been submitted for a degree at any other university. 
 
Signed: 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study analyses whether the advent of strike action has an effect on the value and volatility of the 
South African Rand compared with the US Dollar. The literature suggests that strike action can have 
a significant effect on the exchange rate in terms of either value or volatility, and consequences can 
result that cause inefficiencies in the economy; inhibiting employment and economic growth. Strike 
action has become common place in South Africa, with 2012 alone recording 99 strikes, 45 of which 
were “wildcat” or unprotected strikes. This study uses GARCH and Intervention Analyses to 
determine what the resulting effects of the strikes might be on the exchange rate. The analysis used 
ZAR/USD exchange rate data for the period January 2000 to October 2013, and covered 72 of the 
most significant strikes in terms of lost man-days. The results are mixed, suggesting that the effects 
of strikes do not always conform to expectations (increased volatility and a depreciation in the Rand), 
and that outside factors affecting the global economy may have a more significant effect on the 
exchange rate than strikes on their own.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context of the Research 
According to Chapter 2, Section 23, of the South African Constitution, every worker has the right to 
form or join a trade union, to participate in trade union activities, and to strike. This provision is to 
ensure that the right to fair labour practice is protected and that workers’ rights and dignity remain in 
place. Bhana (1997:43) notes that South Africa has followed the trend of many developing countries 
since the late 1980’s, with a sharp rise in the number of industrial strikes. As the occurrence of strikes 
is increasing, Dolamo (2012) argues that investors and industry analysts are now paying more 
attention to the implications of these events. Strike action is usually undertaken by workers in order 
to force employers to increase their wages or force action on some other dispute such as poor working 
conditions and other grievances. The effect of such strikes on the relevant company and industry is a 
significant loss of working hours resulting in decreased productivity, increased unemployment, as 
well as driving inflationary pressures in the economy of a country. This is especially true if wage 
rates rise at a rate above that of inflation (Balston et al., 2012:36-39).  
Some of the strikes that have taken place over the past few years and have dominated news headlines 
are the Marikana incident (10 August 2012 – 18 September 2012) (News24, 2012), the farm workers’ 
strike in the Western Cape (27 August 2012 – 22 January 2012) (Etheridge, 2013), and the truck 
drivers’ strike or transport strike (24 September – 12 October 2012) (City Press, 2012). Strike 
contagion often causes prolonged unrest in the country, and negatively affects investor sentiment with 
regard to South African stocks and products. According to News24 (2013b) and Brand (2013), the 
Rand traded weaker following the above-mentioned strikes, and investor sentiment weakened due to 
concerns surrounding the future of the strike-affected industry and the violent nature of the strikes.  
Dolamo (2012:15) estimated that by early November 2012 the short-term cost of the Marikana 
incident was already significant, with around 780 000 ounces of platinum production lost, amounting 
to R15 billion in lost revenue to the sector and R1 billion in lost income to the state. According to 
News24 (2013a), “the rand softened against the dollar […] amid fears of more trouble in the mining 
sector after Anglo Platinum said workers at its Rustenburg operations were likely to stay away 
following violence [the previous day]”, which indicated that there were still on-going issues in the 
industry, stemming from previous labour unrest.  
Melvin and Tan (1996:340) argue that country risk variables such as strikes, riots and related deaths 
and violence lead to an increase in the spread (level) of the exchange rate directly, as well as indirectly 
through the conditional variance (volatility) in the exchange rate. Investor sentiment is thus an 
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important aspect when considering the impact of strikes on the South African exchange rate, as 
investors will quickly relocate their assets if they foresee volatile, degenerating conditions. With the 
advent of strikes and general labour unrest in various sectors, Scherer (2013) suggests that foreign 
investors may be dissuaded from investing in South Africa due to the perceived danger relating to the 
risk inherent in developing countries as well as the local market conditions. This is evidenced in an 
article by Fin24 (2013b) in mid-May 2013, which stated the Rand has become weaker due to renewed 
concerns over South Africa’s labour dynamics and the large current account deficit. 
Strike action may produce some immediate economic effects that influence the exchange rate. For 
instance, Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) and Melvin and Tan (1996) show that the volatility of a 
currency can be heavily influenced by social-political unrest, and that it will reduce production, 
resulting in higher per unit costs as well as fewer units available for export. Koehler and Hespenheide 
(2013:106) argue that the resulting “loss in productivity/increase in cost” will in turn cause a fall in 
the revenue of the firms involved, which will reduce the value of the firms’ shares. These factors will 
then make labour comparatively more expensive, thereby reducing the demand for labour. This would 
have the effect of reducing the buying power of the Rand domestically, ultimately resulting in higher 
prices and increased unemployment, as companies lay off workers to cut costs.  
When considering the effects which strikes have on the economy, it is evident through the previous 
two paragraphs that strikes seem to have both long-run and short-run effects. For example, Scherer 
(2013) suggests that investor sentiment can have an immediate effect on the exchange rate due to a 
perceived increase in risk, while Koehler and Hespenheide (2013) note that the loss in productivity 
will cause a fall in revenue over time as there is less of the product to sell. If the company is in the 
export industry this will mean that a decreased amount of foreign exchange will be earned, there will 
be a lesser demand for the Rand to purchase these products, and as a result depreciation will occur. It 
was decided to pursue the immediate and contemporaneous impacts in this study as it was thought 
that measuring the impacts over a short time frame would provide more accurate results than a long 
term period as there were fewer variables to consider. 
The scenario of wages rising above the inflation rate is evidenced in Roelf (2012), who reported that 
truck drivers “have agreed to accept wage increases of 10% from March 2013, 8% in 2014 and 9% 
for 2015.” These wage increases are significantly above the inflation band target of the Reserve Bank 
(3-6%), implying an increase in real wages. In addition, in 2013 Brand (2013) noted that the 
unemployment rate may rise due to mining companies’ plans to dismiss workers, after strike action 
in 2012 reduced production and increased labour cost. Brand (2013) also argues that recent major 
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strikes in the mining, transport and farming industries have had a negative effect on exports and 
growth in South Africa, which has further implications in terms of investor sentiment. 
While much of the discussion so far has related to matters regarding the increased volatility of the 
exchange rate in times of violent protest, little has been said on the level of the Rand when compared 
to other currencies. Many news articles (News24, 2013a; Brand, 2013; Downing, 2012) suggest that 
the Rand is open to significant devaluations following the news of strike action in the country’s more 
significant or vulnerable sectors. A depreciating currency has a number of implications including, but 
not limited to, the increased cost of imports (including petroleum products), capital flight (investors 
fear losing their gains to exchange rate fluctuations), as well as making foreign debt more expensive 
to repay for local government and firms. In addition, Aron et al. (1997:25) argue that inflation is also 
worsened by low economic growth as higher wages outstrip growth, which may force the Reserve 
Bank to hike interest rates. Another consequence of a depreciating currency is the possibility of 
increased unemployment as employers lay off workers in an attempt to retain profitability or reduce 
input costs (Brand, 2013). 
1.2 Goals of the Research 
The primary goal of this research is to examine the effect of strike action in South Africa on the level 
and volatility of the Rand/Dollar exchange rate. 
1.3 Methods, Procedures and Techniques 
This study will employ a positivist paradigm that involves using quantitative methodology and 
modelling to obtain the results. Daily exchange rate data for the Rand/US Dollar exchange rate will 
be used for the period January 2000 to April 2013 (Standard Bank, 2013). Strikes to be considered 
were selected based on the number of man-days lost in production (South African Survey, 2013).  
Specific econometric methods will be employed to determine the effect of strikes on the level and 
volatility of the Rand. These include intervention analysis and Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. While intervention analysis makes use of 
appropriate exogenous dummy variables applicable for analysing the effects of strike action on the 
level of the exchange rate, a GARCH model can be used to examine the effect on volatility. 
Intervention analysis allows for estimating both the initial and long-run impact of strikes on the 
exchange rate (Enders, 2010). GARCH models, in turn, would make it possible to analyse the effect 
of strike actions on the conditional volatility of the exchange rate. 
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1.4 Organisation of the Study 
The study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background relating to the effects 
of strike action, and provides a review of the relevant literature. Chapter 3 discusses the data and 
econometric methods used. Chapter 4 presents the empirical results. Chapter 5 concludes and 
provides areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF STRIKE LITERATURE AND THE 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STRIKE ACTION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical literature relating to strike action as well as the expected 
economic effects resulting from such an occurrence. Section 2.2 explores the various characteristics 
and risks associated with strikes, and tracks the historical evolution of strike action. This includes 
views on the use of strikes as a bargaining tool for wage negotiations and what effect they are expected 
to have on the exchange rate, as well as the related benefit and cost to both worker and employer. 
Section 2.3 investigates the theoretical effects of strike action such as increased bid-ask spreads for 
foreign exchange, the depreciation of the currency in question, and inflation. Section 2.4 explores the 
impact on trade created by strike action and the associated economic effects of depreciation, inflation 
and a volatile exchange rate. Labour unrest is then linked to volatility in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 
explores literature surrounding previous studies of the effect of strikes on the exchange rate and stock 
market, and also links the performance of stocks and the exchange rate. A summary of the chapter is 
provided in Section 2.7. 
2.2 The characteristics and risks of strike action 
Bhana (1997) considered various studies surrounding strikes and their costs. The study includes notes 
on whether there is a discernible effect on industry output, the costs of strikes at a micro level 
(including lost productivity within the business and customers diversifying their products or changing 
their suppliers), lost profits, and long-term costs such as maintaining an inventory in case of work 
disruptions. It is thus evident that actually measuring the exact costs of strikes can be difficult, given 
all the variables involved and the unique environment characteristic of the industry in which the 
business is located. This is due to outside factors having a significant effect on exchange rate data; 
such as quantitative easing and economic events such as the release of large economies’ employment 
data. It is thus important to note that studies may employ different techniques and assumptions in 
reaching their conclusions, as well as viewing data and models in a different situational context 
(Bhana, 1997; Melvin and Tan, 1996; McConnell, 1989). 
Bhana (1997:43) and McConnell (1989:801) note that strikes are traditionally viewed by economists 
as a breakdown in collective bargaining, and that strikes can be seen from the point of view of the 
worker, as a sacrifice of current income in the hope of larger returns in the future. With economists 
and negotiators viewing strikes as a failure in the bargaining process, Bhana (1997:44) however 
argues that strikes are actually an “inevitable part of the functioning of an institutionalized market 
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economy.” This theory is backed up by Becker and Olsen (1986:437) who also suggest that the market 
would respond positively to a peaceful settlement. This is an interesting observation, which seems 
applicable given the increasing global trend of strike action or threatened strike action to achieve a 
worker’s objectives.  
Bhana (1997:43) found that higher post-strike wages were of higher present value than the income 
lost due to strike activity, and these combined with the costs mentioned earlier in this section, make 
strikes rather costly to firms. It was also argued by Bhana (1997:43) that, due to these costs and the 
resulting decrease in expected cash flows, the firm’s business strategies would need to evolve. This 
would result in decreased efficiency in the decision making process, and cause a further reduction in 
the firm’s value. Bhana (1997:49) finds that the costs of strikes are usually underestimated, as nearly 
70% of the decline in stock market share prices occured after a strike was announced. Becker and 
Olsen (1986:425) offer very similar evidence to Bhana, as they state that the stock market consistently 
underestimates the cost to shareholders of a strike, as “nearly two-thirds” of the fall in returns occurs 
after the strike was announced, which is in contrast to the view offered by the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
The conclusions drawn by Bhana (1997) show that the advent of a strike brings about statistically 
significant, negative abnormal returns, implying increased volatility and a fall in value of the shares 
in question. This occurred even though there was some evidence of market efficiency with decreases 
beginning in the days preceding a strike announcement. However, Bhana (1997) argued that if strikes 
were completely predictable, the announcement of a strike would not have such negative effects. Due 
to wage bargaining and labour contract expiration dates being known in advance, investors can 
sometimes predict the onset of a strike as well as how long it will continue for, with longer strikes 
expected to be more costly (Balston et al., 2012:38). 
McConnell (1989:801) examines the relationship between wages and strikes in order to shed light on 
the empirical relevance of some strike models, arguing that there are two theories that explain why 
strikes occur. The first theory coincides with the view held by Bhana (1997:43) and states that strikes 
are accidents or mistakes that occur during negotiations, and that the only prediction of this theory is 
that strikes should happen less often and be shorter when the cost of the strike is higher. The second 
theory proposed by McConnell (1989:802) suggests that the strike is used to detect asymmetrical 
information in the wage-bargaining environment to gain information from the firm's management on 
the size of the economic rent that accrues from the firm's activity. The interpretation of this second 
theory is essentially that workers believe that the profits reaped by the firm may be large enough to 
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justify higher wages for themselves. This model predicts that strikes should occur more regularly and 
be more persistent when the unions believe that there is more rent to be had than there actually is. 
The most significant finding of McConnell’s (1989) study is that both the occurrence and length of a 
strike are negatively related to the component of the real wage that is uncertain. This supports the 
theory that strikes are used as tools to reveal information rather than as a result of errors during the 
negotiation process. 
Cramton and Tracy (1992) assess the theory and implications behind strikes and holdouts, and to do 
this they analyse what is behind the union’s decision to embark on a strike action or hold-out, and the 
significance of this decision with regards to strike action. Cramton and Tracy (1992:1) trace the 
development of strike literature from John Hicks in 1932 with his theory that strikes were a result of 
faulty negotiation to Arthur Ross’ view in 1948 that argued that a union leader may be motivated by 
personal advancement and the elevation of the union; therefore a more political than economic cause. 
Cramton and Tracy (1992:1) also note that Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) advanced Ross’ theory 
by arguing that strikes occur when certain wage expectations are higher than what the firm is willing 
to offer. In order to avoid internal conflict between members and union leadership by not negotiating 
the employers to a higher wage settlement, union leaders may prefer to resort to strike actions in order 
to demonstrate to the workers that a higher wage is not possible (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969:39). 
Cramton and Tracy (1992:2) argue that there is an increase in the chance of workers striking if there 
is a decrease in their real wages due to uncompensated inflation increases, unemployment rates 
decrease and therefore the reservation wage increases, as well as when there is a significant increase 
in the firm’s profitability due to an increased demand for its products.  
2.3 Theoretical economic consequences of strike action 
2.3.1 Inflation 
One of the effects of strike action is inflation caused by rising wages and price levels. This is why it 
was noted by Tswamuno et al. (2007:81) that South African monetary authorities have taken a 
number of steps to improve macroeconomic reform as well as to increase the participation of local 
investors. Furthermore, it was also noted by Tswamuno et al. (2007:81) that possibly the most 
important of these steps was the South African Reserve Bank’s decision to adopt an inflation targeting 
framework in February 2000, with a target range of between 3% and 6%. It was also mentioned that 
a commission was appointed to investigate the fall and instability of the Rand in 2001, and that the 
recommended reforms led to a massive comeback in terms of the value of the Rand, as well as reduced 
volatility in the market for foreign exchange (with regards to the trading of the Rand). The reforms 
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suggested by the commission, as well as the security and assurance provided by the implementation 
of an inflation targeting framework by the South African Reserve Bank, seemed to increase investor 
confidence and inspire a more stable and valuable Rand (Tswamuno et al., 2007). 
Some causes of inflation are “an increase in the international price of oil, a fall in the exchange rate, 
nationwide excessive salary and wage hikes, or an increase in food prices caused by drought or other 
forces of nature” (SARB, 2012b:2). Two of these causes, namely a depreciation in the exchange rate 
and nationwide excessive salary hikes, can theoretically link inflation with strike action. This is 
evident in Downing (2012), for example, where it was observed that the Rand weakened due to 
concern by traders as strikes for large pay hikes continued in early November 2012. 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2012a:2) describes some of the key negative aspects related 
to inflation. The first is related to the loss of value to savers, as inflation erodes the purchasing power 
of the money that is saved. Investopedia (2015) describes purchasing power parity as “An economic 
theory that estimates the amount of adjustment needed on the exchange rate between countries in 
order for the exchange to be equivalent to each currency's purchasing power,” which essentially 
translates to the amount an exchange rates must adjust so that a specific product in two different 
countries is the equivalent price when stated in the same currency. For example, a motor vehicle 
which sells for USD10,000 in America would cost R100,000 in South Africa if the exchange rate was  
ten rand to the US Dollar. Thus when inflation occurs, this raises the relative cost of the good and 
causes a depreciation in that country’s currency. Secondly, inflation affects retirees as it has an 
eroding effect on the value of pension plans, making the elderly more vulnerable to increasing costs. 
De Wet and Diale (2013) note that many workers in South Africa are facing considerable erosion to 
their lifestyles and quality of life due to significant increases in energy and food costs, with workers 
seeking relief through wage negotiations to maintain or increase their real wage levels. Another 
adverse effect of inflation is the reduction in real income to those who receive fixed incomes, as 
purchasing power decreases over time (SARB, 2012a:12). Inflation can also accrue as a loss to 
taxpayers, as an inflation-linked salary may advance one into a higher tax bracket, causing one to pay 
a greater percentage of one’s income towards tax than before. Another adverse effect of inflation 
noted by SARB (2012a:2) is the confusing price signals sent to producers that complicate the business 
environment. This means that traders would not know how to efficiently allocate their resources and 
miss-allocations would occur until some sort of equilibrium was reached. This particular factor was 
also highlighted by Fedderke and Schaling (2005:79) who state that due to inflation uncertainty, 
mark-ups on goods in South Africa are three times higher than in the USA.  
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Inflation also causes less attention to be paid to productivity in a sector (SARB, 2012a:3). In order to 
achieve a higher standard of living in a country, improving productivity levels is important as it is 
sustainable and generates greater income. In the absence of inflation, wage negotiations are focused 
on employees’ productivity levels and whether they have improved or not. High incidences of 
inflation, however, cause wage negotiations to lose focus of these aspects, and thus productivity 
becomes less important and output levels suffer. Balston et al. (2012:38) argue that the growth of real 
wages far above that of productivity growth in recent years has resulted in South Africa having one 
of the weakest employment performances in the emerging markets, with competitiveness expected to 
remain weak.  
It is argued in SARB (2012a:3) that a society infected by a high incidence of inflation will focus more 
energy on redistributive issues, in which each consumer attempts to gain a better price, wage or 
position. This has a seriously negative effect, as it consequentially destroys the fabric society is built 
upon by undermining the position of others relative to their own. Some may argue that inflation is 
good as it helps stimulate economic growth, however, Mishkin (2007:617) shows that an increased 
money supply causes a rise in price levels and effectively there is no real increase in GDP. This is 
evident in Figure 2, where price levels and the supply and demand for labour can be observed 
graphically. 
According to SARB (2012b:4), the South African Reserve Bank is strongly opposed to inflation 
pressures and implements policies in an attempt to combat it. Policy action is determined to be 
imperative for sustained economic growth, prosperity and an equitable distribution of wealth. It has 
thus been deemed necessary that a low level of inflation and a stable financial environment are 
required for a sustainable future. However, de Wet and Diale (2013) argue that excessive salary hikes 
could push inflation out of the SARB’s target band, and also noted that the Economist Intelligence 
Unit gave South Africa the low score of 57/100 for labour risk rating in 2009, implying a considerable 
perceived risk in the South African labour market. 
Mishkin (2007:620) notes that there are two types of inflation that occur when countries follow 
policies that seek to increase employment levels. These are namely cost-push inflation and demand-
pull inflation. The former kind occurs due to negative supply shocks or an attempt by workers to 
increase their wages, while the latter results from policies that shift the aggregate demand curve to 
the right. In terms of South African strikes, most are either for higher wages and better working 
conditions or sympathy strikes for those seeking the higher wages or suffering under poor working 
conditions. This is evidenced in the South Africa Survey (2000-2012) (Table 1) with the majority of 
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strikes being wage and grievance related. As such, the theory surrounding cost-push inflation will be 
examined and how it is affected by workers seeking higher wage rates.  
The theory is depicted in Figure 2, adapted from Mishkin (2007:620). We assume the economy is 
initially at the intersection point of the aggregate demand curve (AD1) and the aggregate supply curve 
(AS1) at point 1. Assuming workers decide to strike because they believe they deserve higher wages 
either to increase their real wage or combat inflation, the effect of such an increase in wages is to shift 
the aggregate supply curve to the left (AS1 to AS2). If government does not take action and amend 
the fiscal and monetary policies, the economy would shift to 1’, which would mean that output would 
decline below its natural level to Y’ and prices would increase to P1’. An important aspect to consider 
then is how policy makers would respond to this decline in relative productivity and increased price 
levels. Policy makers targeting unemployment would theoretically seek to raise aggregate demand 
(shifting AD1 rightward toward AD2) and return to the natural rate of output, and a further price 
increase to P2. The short term result would be that the workers had not done too badly and received 
higher wages. The government or company has in effect given in to the workers’ demands at their 
own expense. A policy, whereby its aim is to seek high employment levels, is sometimes referred to 
as an accommodating policy. South Africa is likely following such a policy due to president Zuma’s 
continued promise to create jobs, as well as the pressure put on companies by government when they 
threatened to dismiss workers (Fin24, 2013b). 
Mishkin (2007:261) argued that if a country pursues such accommodation policies, it is easy for 
workers to take advantage and effectively “jump on the band wagon” in terms of striking and 
demanding higher wages. This is because workers have realised they have power and either want to 
raise their wages even more, or because they want to keep up with their fellow workers’ rising wages 
i.e. “keeping up with the Jones’s”. The result is a continued movement up the long-run AS (i.e. LRAS) 
curve with policies maintaining the natural rate of output through expansionist policies and workers 
shifting the supply curve upwards with increased wage demands in a never ending cycle. Some 
evidence of workers “jumping on the band wagon” is noted in Stoddard and Flack (2012) where 
wildcat strikes had spread from the gold and platinum mines to the iron mines, with fears of strike 
action spreading to the coal sector, which would compromise Eskom and the country’s power supply. 
However, Mishkin (2007:261) argues that “cost-push inflation is a monetary phenomenon because it 
cannot occur without the monetary authorities pursuing an accommodating policy of a higher rate of 
growth.” The SARB (2012a:2) notes that it is the Reserve Bank’s mission to protect the value of the 
Rand and thus to prevent high inflation. It could thus be argued that because the Reserve Bank is the 
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monetary authority in the country, the South African economy should not be subject to cost-push 
inflation. However, due to the uncompromising nature of the strikes in South Africa and the inability 
to effectively negotiate with workers, government and companies are facing ever increasing labour 
costs, with some mining companies now shifting towards automation (Maboja, 2013). The 
phenomenon described in the cost-push inflation analysis using supply and demand curves is 
becoming a reality, with striking workers usually winning a substantial (greater that projected 
inflation) increase in wages (Balston et al., 2012:38). 
Balston et al. (2012:38) note that the problems in South Africa’s labour market are complex and are 
mainly a result of apartheid era legacies such as high transport costs, lack of formal housing, skills 
shortages, and excessive labour policies that protect workers from being fired. These structural 
concerns are exacerbated by low levels of education and high youth unemployment. The result has 
been an excessive growth in real wages, far above that of productivity growth. This resulted in South 
Africa having one of the weakest employment performances in the emerging markets category 
(Balston et al., 2012:38). When wages rise faster than productivity, goods become relatively more 
expensive (inflation), which in turn causes a greater disparity in purchasing power parity terms, 
resulting in that country’s currency depreciating. 
2.3.2 Investor Perceptions 
Investor perceptions are essentially the views that investment professionals hold concerning the value 
of an asset. Essentially it comes down to a risk versus reward scenario with factors such as currency 
risk, company performance, and the state of the local economy, being important factors worth 
considering. Mishkin (2007:95) argues that “the degree of risk or uncertainty of an asset’s returns 
also affects the demand for the asset”, and because most investors are risk-averse, if one holds all 
other variables constant, the quantity of the asset (in this case foreign exchange) demanded will 
decrease if there is no corresponding increase in return to an increase in the risk of the asset.  
Aron et al. (1997:1) note that exchange rate management is one of the most important concerns in 
South Africa, with the real exchange rate being an important price signalling mechanism for inter-
sectoral growth in the medium to long term, and hence is also a signal to investors as to what the 
economic environment might be like over the same period. With the Rand experiencing a long term 
decline, this means that the Rand will be weaker in the future and may contribute to a long term 
investor’s decisions. Evidence showing the long term depreciation of the Rand can be seen when 
constructing a graph showing the value of the Rand compared to the US Dollar (Figure 3). 
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2.3.3 The bid-ask spread and country risk 
Melvin and Tan (1996:329) note that volatility in time series data insinuates that there is a bigger 
difference between the bid and ask prices of volatile assets, which are used to compensate dealers for 
the risk that they assume. Additionally, they argue that emerging markets, such as South Africa, are 
more exposed to changes in the economy and inflation from exchange rate fluctuations than the larger, 
more developed economies. Khan (2009:125) argues that exchange rates are also more likely to 
exceed their accepted levels with emerging markets being vulnerable to trade swings and the risk of 
capital flight. Melvin and Tan (1996:330) state that these vulnerabilities are driven by changing 
economic fundamentals or contagion effects from risk-wary investors. This suggests that if there are 
high levels of foreign denominated debt, a large flux in the exchange rate can have very significant 
effects as the domestic cost of the foreign debt balloons. 
According to Melvin and Tan (1996:334), country risk can be described as the risk of an unexpected 
change in the political or social situation in a country that negatively affects the returns of foreign 
investors. Evidence found by Melvin and Tan (1996) indicates that the more often risk-perceived 
events take place in a country, the higher the conditional variance will be with regards to the value of 
the Rand and a greater bid-ask spread will be found in the foreign exchange market. Mulholland et 
al. (2013:5) argue that most foreign investors still prefer to hedge their local (South African) 
purchases using bonds and equities in the foreign exchange market, and will do so until some of these 
risks (e.g. trade data and labour strikes) improve. Consistent with Mulholland et al. (2013), Porter 
(2013) shows that the proportion of foreign investment since early 2009 has been directed mainly 
towards South African bonds, with the level of equity investment remaining fairly constant after an 
initial surge. It thus follows that South Africa’s future foreign direct investment (FDI) flows will most 
probably be dominated by short-term deposits and bonds, as risk-averse investors will fear losses 
through depreciation and volatility concerns. 
This confirms Melvin and Tan’s (1996) findings that unrest resulting from strike action causes 
broader bid-ask spreads (increased volatility). This is evident in Fin24 (2013b) where it was noted 
that the Rand was under pressure from a strengthening dollar and bonds also weakened due to 
concerns that job losses in the mining sector could reignite previous labour unrest and thus contribute 
to instability in the economy. 
2.3.4 Investor sentiment with regard to labour 
Teitelbaum and Robertson (2008) examine the relationship between labour protest and FDI in low- 
and middle-income countries and the effect that it has on investor behaviour. Teitelbaum and 
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Robertson (2008:2) argue that research on FDI has shown that public protests can cause instability 
within the economy, which has a negative effect on foreign investment volumes. Teitelbaum and 
Robertson (2008:2) argue that this arrangement of “democracy good, protest bad” is a paradox of 
sorts, as democracy is not just about property rights, but also about the right to vote and freely speak 
one’s mind, and it is because of this that democracies have more protests and make the local market 
less appealing to potential foreign investors. A major point raised by Teitelbaum and Robertson 
(2008:2) that may merit further research, is that while the idea of a country being democratic is 
perceived to have a positive effect through accountability and property rights, the major down-side 
risk for investors it exacerbates is the freedom it affords to the local labour unions.  
When considering what characteristics of an economy may create (or negate) higher FDI, it is prudent 
to assess which characteristics of the country in question are held in favourable regard by investors. 
Asiedu (2006:12) found that “sizeable local markets, natural resources, decent infrastructure, a low 
inflation environment, an efficient legal system and a well-structured investment framework promote 
FDI.” However, it was also found that corruption and instability have a negative effect in attracting 
foreign capital flows.  
Fedderke and Romm (2006) investigated the growth impact and determinants of FDI and note that 
increasing wage costs impact FDI significantly and with a highly negative elasticity. This would mean 
that FDI would flow out of the country as soon as the cost of labour begins to increase as it would 
reduce potential profits to investors. This theory could be applied in the case of strike action to those 
companies/industries forced to increase wages due to ongoing strikes. Other observations by 
Fedderke and Romm (2006) include views on the openness of the economy and the volume of its 
trade influencing FDI. The volume of trade may be affected by work stoppages and the loss of man-
hours due to strikes. In addition, the political institutional structure is also an important determinant 
of FDI, as it is concerned with the protection of property rights and political stability. Thus, increasing 
wages and incidences of strike action (as a sign of political instability) could be seen as portraying a 
negative image to potential foreign investors.  
According to Visser (2005:30), COSATU spokespersons have indicated on numerous occasions that 
the federation would resist any actions by employers, whether by the state or the private sector, which 
would lead to the retrenchment of workers. Such resistance is likely to materialise as protest actions 
by means of strike action. This means that where companies are becoming non-profitable to operate, 
and thus may need to lay off workers to reduce the variable portion of their costs, they are being 
threatened with further losses in income to prevent them from shedding jobs. This may not be a 
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situation in which a foreign investor wishes to have their funds tied up, and so there is a fall in demand 
for the Rand over time, and the currency depreciates. 
2.3.5 Foreign exposure and firm value 
An additional factor worth considering is the extent of damages that specific industries are exposed 
to through the effects of strikes and a volatile, depreciating currency. In relation to this, Doukas et al. 
(2003:342) have identified in Japan a strong consistency that links current stock returns and 
unanticipated fluctuations in the value of the Yen. This relationship appears to be stronger for those 
corporations and firms with higher foreign exposure, compared to firms with little or no involvement 
in the international market. Put into a South African context, this link may explain why the more 
significant strikes appear to occur in South Africa’s key export or export-related industries. 
Furthermore, Doukas et al. (2003:342) note that capital flows in and out of a country aid in 
determining the strength of the exchange rate by measuring the demand for the currency, and thus the 
firms who conduct business with foreign countries and firms tend to be the most affected by changes 
in the value of the currency as the trading of goods and services either becomes more profitable or 
expensive. 
The view that exchange rate movements affect the cash-flows and hence stock returns for various 
firms and consequentially has a role in influencing the value of a firm, is explored by Doukas et al. 
(2003). This was achieved by analysing the exposure of various Japanese firms to exchange rate 
fluctuations using various testing procedures such as impact analyses and GARCH applications. The 
effect the changing exchange rate had on foreign denominated costs and revenues, as well as on the 
terms of competition for firms with international linkages, were some of the main focus areas.  
Doukas et al. (2003:292) noted that there has been a broadened use of exchange rate management 
tools and applications, as well as extensive utilization by firms of foreign-denominated derivatives 
and other forms of hedging instruments to protect their foreign cash flows and portfolios from 
unexpected shocks in the market. This would imply that the value of firm is sensitive to exchange 
rate uncertainty. The implication of this is that firms which have an exposure to international markets 
run the risk of having their revenue stream influenced by changes in the exchange rate. These firms 
thus have to engage in hedging strategies if they are to avoid the risk of a sudden flux in the value of 
the Rand eroding their profits and possibly causing losses. Additionally, Doukas et al. (2003:292) 
argue that currency risk is an important aspect to investors, since a devaluation of the currency erodes 
the value of the local investment on the international market. Currency, or exchange rate risk, was 
explored by Jorian (1991:2) who noted that this type of risk is a “major source of concern” for 
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multinational companies, and that it means that strikes in those areas with higher foreign exposure 
bear a greater risk of causing a reduction in the value of the currency. This is especially true in South 
Africa where a large number of strikes are occurring in the mining industry, as is evidenced by the 
number of man-days lost in production in this sector over recent years (South Africa Survey: 2000-
2012). This is worrying as the mining industry is a significant contributor to South Africa’s GDP 
(around 7% of GDP) (SARB, 2013). 
Bodnar and Gentry (1993) also present evidence that exchange rate fluctuations have an impact on 
the perceived value apparent at an industry and firm level. The results indicated that of the countries 
tested (Canada, Japan and the USA) more than 20 per cent of industries had significant exchange rate 
exposures, while exchange rate fluctuations were also of significance in determining the individual 
industry returns. An interesting aspect highlighted by Bodnar and Gentry (1993:42) was that the 
impact of exchange rate movements on returns for most industries was greater for the smaller 
economies of Canada and Japan compared to the larger economy of the USA. Bodnar and Gentry 
(1993:42) went on to suggest that the changing exchange rate is more likely to have a larger impact 
on smaller open economies. One might assume that the South African economy is relatively open; as 
Porter (2013:3) notes that the Rand is one of the “most liquid and frequently traded” currencies and 
that there is significant foreign involvement by foreigners in terms of investing in stocks and bonds, 
we might expect similar effects here. 
2.3.6 Lagged effects of strike action 
While it is not particularly evident in any economic publications, Maswanganyi (2014) and Mail and 
Guardian (2013) both note how the effects of strikes are still evident after the strikes have been 
concluded. Maswanganyi (2014) notes how strikes in the platinum, engineering and steel industries 
throughout the year had combined to mute industrial output and reduced the business confidence 
index, while Mail and Guardian (2013) argues that due to industrial action, the Beti index 
(BankservAfrica Transaction Index) showed a decline for an additional month or so, as transactions 
lagged after strikes. This would indicate that there is a dynamic related to strike action which reduces 
the efficiency of the economy and causes negative effects for a period after the strike has ended. 
These negative effects (loss in business confidence and reduced production levels) would have a 
corresponding negative effect on the exchange rate (depreciation). 
2.4 The link between labour unrest and a volatile exchange rate 
In an emerging markets report on South Africa, Mulholland et al. (2013:1) stated that the wage 
negotiation season of 2013 was expected to be plagued again by labour relations issues that began in 
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2012. Workers were able to secure unplanned salary increases and bonuses as a result of 
(illegal/unprotected) strikes and are thus expected to continue to use work stoppages as their primary 
tool for negotiations. This is worrying from an investor’s perspective due to lost productivity and 
revenue as well as decreasing returns on equities. Decreased productivity and higher costs make it 
more difficult for South African firms to compete abroad and thus contribute towards a weaker 
exchange rate. From an employer’s perspective, Mulholland et al. (2013:2) argue that the recent 
reduction in commodity prices and continued pressures on revenue will make companies negotiate 
harder than in earlier years, with the closure of business operations as a primary means of negotiation. 
This would imply the retrenchment of workers and higher unemployment. An example of this is 
provided by Shilton (2012) who noted that on the 26th of September 2012, Lonmin was about to retire 
one of its mine-shafts and terminate a contract with a labour agency that was responsible for supplying 
staff, which effectively led to approximately 1 200 people losing their jobs. This would potentially 
have a depreciating effect on the exchange rate as less platinum would be exported, resulting in a 
decrease of export oriented foreign exchange earnings and a negative impact on the balance of trade. 
Mulholland et al. (2013:1) stated that the majority of bargaining power lay with the workers and thus 
there was expected to be continued pressure on shares and the Rand. It was further noted that the 
negative pressures shown in the stock market can cause currency depreciation. This would be as a 
result of foreign investors diversifying their risk away, which would compound inflation pressures in 
the economy, as imported goods would become relatively more expensive. 
Mulholland et al. (2013:1) also discuss the various risks that could possibly cause disruptions in the 
negotiating process with regard to the mining industry in particular. The National Union of Metal 
Workers (NUM) has been challenged by the emergence of a new union in the form of the Association 
of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), which could cause tensions in the bargaining 
process. It has also been stressed by Mulholland et al. (2013) that the circumstances leading up to the 
strikes in 2012 had still not been resolved, these being discontentment arising from inconsistent wage 
structuring, poor living conditions and harsh production-related remuneration conditions.  
The spread of strikes in the mining sector in late 2012 was attributed to the emergence of AMCU as 
a viable alternative and rival to NUM as well as the opportunistic nature of the strikers and the 
involvement of their respective communities (Mulholland et al., 2013). Janse van Vuuren (2013) 
describes the difficulty of formulating bargaining agreements between mine management and the 
competing unions. Problems were encountered when a confrontation broke out between members of 
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an AMCU worker committee and officials belonging to NUM, as well as companies stalling in their 
recognition of AMCU as a legitimate union as they were not involved in a peace negotiation process. 
In terms of investor perceptions, Mulholland et al. (2013:1) also indicated that strike fatigue in the 
mining sector during the 2013 wage negotiation season would be lower than expected due to the 
emergence of AMCU as a rival to NUM. The unions are expected to compete for the best offers for 
their members and thus aggressively pursue higher wages, compounding inflation and weak exchange 
rate woes. The only effective bargaining tool available to companies is a closure. It is then argued 
that foreign investors “prefer stocks with lower earnings exposure to South Africa, and those with 
less labour cost through higher exposure to open-pit and mechanised mining” (Mulholland et al., 
2013:1). It could be argued that the persistence of strike action is creating a negative view of South 
Arica’s labour system as well as forcing companies to become less dependent on labour, thus further 
contributing to unemployment. 
Balston et al. (2012:36) argued that the “seasonal strikes” of the past have come to an end, replaced 
instead by contagion, as the recent wave of violent unrest that accompanied the recent wildcat strikes 
was out of proportion, even by local standards. This resulted in some employers taking a stand by 
dismissing the illegally striking workers. Government failed to play any sort of meaningful role in 
the resolution process, arguably due to the internal elections which were due to be held in December 
2012. The situation was not expected to change and a combination of wage increases and job losses 
were expected. Worryingly, it was further noted by Balston et al. (2012:37) that these wage increases 
could force closures in high cost marginal gold and platinum mines, which employ a large proportion 
of gold/platinum mining labour. This further propagates the view that strikes and the resulting wage 
increases may be posing a threat to the competitiveness of the South African economy, the strength 
of the Rand, as well as the problem of unemployment, as evidenced in CEIC (2013). 
2.5 South African strike behaviour in context 
As South Africa is a reasonably open economy, it is exposed to international events and trends. The 
views that investors hold concerning a country and its economic environment are an important 
determining factor in the movement of capital. International Monetary Fund (2003:16) notes that 
besides sector-specific determinants of foreign direct investment and healthy macroeconomic 
fundamentals (such as sustained growth, low inflation and a stable exchange rate), investors are 
mostly concerned about two things; the commercial side of the market; such as liquidity, taxes, labour 
and infrastructure, and the institutional and regulatory policies and frameworks which encourage 
investment. It would thus mean that should any of these factors change in a detrimental way, 
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investment funds would flow out of the country, and hence the value of the Rand may be affected. 
  
Another point worth noting that may apply to both international and domestic investors is that South 
Africa has seen an increase in the number and wages lost due to strike action since 2009 (Sidimba, 
2014), with 2011 being an exception to this trend. This may have stemmed from the divisions of the 
past and the significant presence of trade unions and unionised workers in the country. South Africa 
is also perceived as a country which has strict laws regarding labour that makes it difficult for 
employers to simply dismiss striking workers (Sidimba, 2014). However, Sidimba (2014) argues that 
this view is due to the opinions of executives rather than the actual labour laws which are in place. It 
is thus difficult to accurately determine the exact perception international investors have, and 
ultimately it will depend on their opinions of the market and labour situation as to whether they invest 
their capital in South Africa. 
2.6 Studies exploring strikes and their impact on exchange rates and the stock market 
2.6.1 Impact on stocks 
There have been a number of studies conducted that consider the impact which strikes have on the 
exchange rate, as well as the effect that they have on stocks and commodities. Bhana (1997) explored 
the effect which a strike has on the share price of an asset, i.e. if there was a strike at Anglo American, 
what affect that might have had on the underlying stock. Bhana (1997:48) found that the beginning 
of the strike was associated with significant, abnormal returns, and that there was a slight reaction 
just before the strike took place, suggesting that some market participants may have been able to 
predict the strike. However, it was also noted by Bhana (1997) that there was a strong negative 
reaction the day after the strike began, suggesting that the market may not have been able to predict 
the strike as consistently as some. Bhana (1997) also found that the market was also unable to predict 
the outcome and length of the strike, as around 70% of the decline in the stock’s value happened after 
the onset of the strike. In short, Bhana (1997) found that at a strike’s onset, the market reacts 
negatively and significantly, while the day after a strike ends, the market reacts in a positive and 
significant way. Additionally, Bhana (1997:48) notes that the positive reaction at the end of the strike 
is generally smaller than the decline at the onset of the strike, suggesting that strikes decrease the 
value of the stock. This suggests an overall negative impact of strikes on the value of stocks.  
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2.6.2 Impact on exchange rate 
While it is not the value or volatility of stocks which we are concerned with in this study, Dimitrova 
(2005:2) suggests that there are two ways in which the value of currency and stocks can influence 
each other. The first way, described by Dimitrova (2005:2), is that stock prices are expected to act 
ambiguously with regards to the value of the currency; this depends on how the value of the currency 
affects a multinational company’s balance sheet. 
The second hypothetical link is that the currency will depreciate if the value of the stock market 
declines. The reason provided by Dimitrova (2005:2) for this is that in markets which have a high 
degree of capital mobility, it is the capital flows rather than the trade flows that determine the demand 
for a particular currency. This means that if a decline in stock prices occurs, foreign investors would 
sell the assets which they hold in that currency, which leads to that currency depreciating. Linked 
with the results of Bhana (1997), this would suggest that strikes would cause both a depreciation in 
the exchange rate, as well as increased volatility (due to foreign investors exchanging their Rand 
denominated investments for something less risky). 
Melvin and Tan (1996) followed a similar approach to Bhana (1997), but instead of measuring stock 
returns, they analysed the difference in spreads (bid and offer prices) in the foreign exchange market. 
The time series evidence from Melvin and Tan’s (1996) study showed that country risk variables like 
strikes and related deaths leads to both a direct and indirect increase in the conditional variance of the 
exchange rate, which cause an increase in the spread. Melvin and Tan (1996:340) also note that there 
is evidence from the cross-sectional analysis that there is an increase in the spread of the exchange 
rate if risk variables such as country risk (which includes strikes) increases. The cost of social/political 
unrest, according to Melvin and Tan (1996:340), was an increase in the spread of the South African 
Rand by 540 basis points on the day upon which the strike occurs. Additionally, if there is a death 
due to politically motivated violence, the spread on the Rand was found to increase by 400 basis 
points. 
Clearly, very little research has been conducted on the effect of strike action on the exchange rate 
specifically. From what has been done, the literature surrounding strikes and their effect on the 
exchange rate (and other related financial instruments) suggests that strikes generally increase 
volatility and cause a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter explored the literature relating to labour unrest and the consequential effects that it has 
at both a micro and macro level in the economy. Challenges created by strikes included an increase 
in inflation as most strikes were wage related and resulted in wage increases significantly above CPI 
figures. These increased wages would result in higher variable costs and increased unemployment. 
Purchasing power parity was also briefly discussed, as it is important to see how economic conditions 
in a country can affect the strength of its currency relative to others. Investor sentiment regarding the 
country is expected to deteriorate if strikes take place, as strikes are associated with violence and 
unrest which increases perceived risk levels. Firms are also expected to be impacted through strikes, 
especially those with exposure to the global markets as foreign profits can be eroded and volatile 
markets can make it difficult to predict price movements. Effects from strike action can also take time 
to materialise, which could be in the form of inflation, reduced production levels and knock-on effects 
to other industries. Some of these effects are more immediate such as the movement of funds in the 
stock and foreign exchange market, while others may take longer to materialise, such as inflation and 
knock-on effects. Strikes were also found to portray a negative image in the view of investors, as they 
could reduce the value of investments while simultaneously increasing risk levels. Additionally, it 
was found that there was a link between the returns on shares listed on the local bourse and the level 
and volatility of the exchange rate. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the methods and data used in this study to determine whether strike action has 
an effect on the value and volatility of the Rand/Dollar exchange rate. A number of methods, 
including GARCH models and intervention analysis are employed to determine the effects of strikes 
on the exchange rate. The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 specifies and sets out 
GARCH framework while Section 3.3 explores the dynamics of intervention analysis. Section 3.4 
outlines the data that will be used, and a summary of the chapter is provided in Section 3.5.  
3.2 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) Framework 
Most economic/financial time series do not display signs of having a constant mean and are subject 
to periods of relative tranquillity as well as phases of high volatility (Enders, 2010:121). Campbell et 
al. (1997:481) observe that large returns tend to be followed by more large returns, and thus the 
volatility of returns appears to be serially correlated. Melvin and Tan (1996:330) note that exchange 
rate data is of a high frequency (in the present case, daily) and that it exhibits clusters of volatility. A 
GARCH model is thus used as it is the most appropriate method of modelling conditional volatility.  
Bollerslev (1986) developed the GARCH approach, which allows the conditional variance of the time 
series to be an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. The error process thus becomes: 
𝜀𝑡 =  𝑉𝑡√ℎ𝑡          (1) 
Where: 𝜎𝑣
2 = 1 and since 𝑉𝑡 is a white noise process, both the conditional and unconditional means 
of 𝜀𝑡 amount to zero. The conditional variance of the error term (ℎ𝑡) can be represented by the 
following ARMA process (Enders, 2010:131): 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ℎ𝑡−1       (2) 
The lagged conditional variance term (ℎ𝑡−1) represents the sum of the conditional variance in the 
moving average component of the heteroskedastic variance, while the 𝜀𝑡−1
2  term is a measure for the 
autoregressive component of the variance. 
Enders (2010:131) notes that an important characteristic of GARCH models is that the shocks to the 
{𝑦𝑡} sequence are representative of an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. The 
{ℎ𝑡} series above is similar to what one would expect an ARMA process to look like. If there is 
conditional heteroskedasticity present, then the correlogram of the squared residuals would indicate 
such.  
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In order to estimate a GARCH model, one must first create an ARMA model of the residuals 
(Campbell et al., 1997:484; Enders, 2010:132). It is also essential that the time series is stationary 
before the estimation of the model can be done, and this can be achieved by differencing (Campbell 
et al., 1997:484). The test for stationarity is thus done before the ARMA equation is estimated as it 
is necessary for the series to be stationary for the equation to be relevant. 
Once the ARMA process has been estimated, a unit root test should be performed on the series in 
order to ensure that it is stationary (Enders, 2010:79). This ARMA process is essentially a plot of the 
residuals of the original exchange rate sequence, and before a GARCH model can be estimated these 
residuals must be tested for ARCH effects. This test is formally known as the Engle test for ARCH 
effects, and was developed using the Lagrange multiplier test in the early 1980’s by R.F. Engle. An 
ARCH LM test essentially tests the residuals of the equation for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity. The ARCH test employs a regression of the squared residuals on the lagged 
squared residuals and a constant term. Enders (2010:138-140) argues that if the test statistic turns out 
to be significant we reject the null of no ARCH effects and conclude that ARCH effects are present. 
If this is the case, then a GARCH model can be implemented. 
Enders (2010:78, 80, 126, 158) notes that the mean will take the form of an ARMA (p, q) model, and 
that by using the Box-Jenkins procedure, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz 
Information Criteria (SIC) can be used to select the most appropriate lag lengths. Burger (2008:340) 
notes that the model with the lowest AIC and SIC is selected, depending on the specification showing 
no evidence of autocorrelation. The model for the dependent variable should thus be free of serial 
correlation and be stationary (characteristic roots falling within the unit circle) (Burger, 2008:340). 
 
In estimating a GARCH process, two related equations are estimated (Enders, 2010:146; Chinzara 
and Aziakpono, 2009:6): 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (Mean equation)       (3) 
and  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞
2 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝ℎ𝑡−𝑝)
0.5
 (Variance equation) (4) 
In equation (3) 𝑥𝑡  is an ARMA process of the order  (𝑝
𝑚, 𝑝𝑞) as well as any exogenous variables. 
The relationship between the two equations is evident in that the ℎ𝑡  is the conditional variance of the 
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error term 𝜀𝑡. Thus, the variance equation above is the GARCH process relating to the 𝜀𝑡 sequence, 
which is essentially the conditional variance of the mean equation.  
The GARCH (1, 1) framework is argued by Enders (2010:147) to be the most common in use for 
assessing volatilities in financial data, with the variance equation taking the form: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1        (5) 
which states that the conditional variance ℎ𝑡 is a function of the mean level of volatility (𝛼0), shocks 
from the previous period (𝜀𝑡−1
2 ) as well as a part of the conditional variance that remains from the 
previous period (ℎ𝑡−1). Additionally, Brooks (2008:389) and Enders (2010:131) state that because 
ℎ𝑡 is the conditional variance, it always remains positive.  
For the purposes of this study, a GARCH (1, 1) model is estimated with the inclusion of an exogenous 
variable in the variance equation. Specifically, the exogenous factor takes the form of a dummy 
reflecting the period of the particular labour strike. The estimated GARCH (1, 1) model is thus 
specified as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡         (6) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖        (7) 
Where all variables are defined as in equations (2) and (3), and where Di is a dummy variable denoting 
the dates of strike i, and is set equal to 1 for the days on which a strike occurs, and 0 otherwise. Of 
main interest for the purposes of this study is the parameter δ in equation (7), which would indicate 
the effect of the specific strike on the volatility of the exchange rate. If δ > 0 (δ < 0), it is assumed 
that a particular strike led to greater (lower) exchange rate volatility. Finally, for the regression results 
to be reliable, all coefficients in the variance equation should be strictly positive, and α1 + β1 < 1. 
 
It is worth noting that other studies have included dummy variables in the conditional variance 
equation. Fang and Miller (2008) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) both use dummy variables in 
their studies. Fang and Miller (2008:16) incorporate a dummy variable into their conditional variance 
equation in order to accommodate any changes which occur. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990:226) 
also use dummy variables in their conditional variance equation in order to ascertain at what time 
sifts in the variance are likely to have occurred. The use of a dummy variable in the conditional 
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variance equation is thus acceptable and useful in determining the timing and impact of shocks and 
changes to the conditional variance. 
 
3.3 Intervention Analysis 
Intervention analysis essentially explores whether there is a significant change in the level of a series 
due to a specific event or intervention. According to Enders (2010:272), an intervention analysis 
allows the time path of a dependent variable to be influenced by the occurrence of an exogenous 
independent variable. Enders (2010:272) adds that if a feedback effect is known not to exist, then 
intervention analysis can be used as a tool to aid in forecasting and the testing of hypotheses. 
Sridharan et al. (2003:9) also argue that intervention analysis is used to assess the impact of a special 
event on the time series of interest such as a strike or other event. The main focus is thus to estimate 
the effect that the intervention or event has on the mean level of the series, but other effects can also 
be considered (Enders, 2010:274). 
There are many kinds of interventions, and these differ both in terms of the onset of the event (whether 
they are immediate or gradual) as well as its duration (permanent or temporary). For example some 
interventions occur only once, are brief in duration, and usually have an effect that occurs abruptly 
and fades quickly (Enders, 2010:274). An example of such an intervention effect may be that which 
occurs following an earthquake or a riot. However, Enders (2010:275) notes that there are effects 
which have a more sustained or gradual onset, and these are generally attributed to scenarios where 
long term effects are expected or are the norm.   
Assuming the existence of an ARMA (p,q) process, the intervention analysis model can be stated as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼0 + (𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡) + 𝑐0𝑧𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, |𝛼1| < 1     (8) 
Where 𝑧𝑡 is the intervention or dummy variable that takes on the value of zero prior to the event 
taking place and unity from when the event occurs, and 𝜀𝑡 is a white-noise disturbance term. This 
study adopted a method similar to the pulse dummy, where a vector of zeros is employed over the 
entire data set, except for the days the strike happened over, which are made to equal to one. 
The dummy variable essentially assumes a value, given a set of criteria. This has the effect of either 
making the variable null and void or, very relevant in assessing the magnitude of the impact. Enders 
(2010:274) notes that this is because the variable assumes the coefficient of zero prior to the test date, 
resulting in a long-run mean for the series equal to 𝛼0/(1 − 𝛼1). However, on the occurrence of an 
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event, the dummy variable assumes the value of unity. This creates a new long-run mean in the form 
(𝛼0 + 𝑐0)/(1 − 𝛼1) as the dummy causes the intercept to jump to 𝛼0 + 𝑐0, thus the initial effect of 
the event (strike) is given by the size of 𝑐0. The long-run effect of the intervention is therefore 
calculated as 𝑐0/(1 − 𝛼1) (Enders, 2010:274). 
Sridharan et al. (2003:9) note that a pulse intervention is employed to capture a single specific event 
in a certain time period, for instance; a holiday or strike action. Events such as this are expected to 
create outliers within the time series sequence. The prolonged pulse allows for these outliers to be 
considered. Enders (2010:275) describes the function as the 𝑧𝑡 sequence being equal to zero in all 
periods except the ones in question i.e. over the period of the strike,, where there it is equal to unity 
and there is a spike or pulse in that period. Enders (2010:275) notes that this function is typical of a 
“purely temporary intervention”, and that the effect of the pulse may well last many periods, due to 
the autoregressive nature of the time series.  
The intervention process which was adopted in this study was of the pulse intervention type, assuming 
that the pulse lasted the duration of the strike whether it is a day or a month under consideration. 
In order to assess whether strike action caused a change in the value of the Rand, an intervention 
analysis is used to measure the initial impact of the strike, as well as the long run effects on the Rand 
after the event. To do this, exchange rate data is selected and put through a number of tests. 
Step 1: Utilise the foreign exchange data to find plausible ARIMA models. Enders (2010:277) notes 
that it is important to ensure that the {𝑦𝑡} sequence is stationary, and this can be confirmed by 
employing unit root tests on the data. An appropriate model must be selected, ensuring that it is the 
most parsimonious for the data at hand. 
Step 2: Estimate the models over the sample period, as well as the intervention effects. The effect of 
strikes could be viewed as either a pulse or a prolonged pulse, depending on the persistence of 
volatility in the system as well as the duration of the strike. 
Step 3: The third step involves diagnostic checks of the equations that have been estimated. Enders 
(2010:278) notes that diagnostic checks in this step are especially important as the observations from 
both pre- and post-intervention periods have been merged. A well estimated intervention model is 
described by Enders (2010:278) as having the following characteristics: All coefficients used in the 
regression analysis should be statistically significant if the model was selected correctly. However, 
coefficients for the dummy variables will only be statistically significant if the event they are 
representing (a strike) has an actual effect on the mean level or volatility of the exchange rate.    In 
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order to ensure the selected model is as parsimonious as possible, Enders (2010:51) argues that the 
residuals should be indicative of a white noise process (constant mean, variance, and independently 
distributed) and the model should “outperform plausible alternatives”. The model was run through 
Eviews using various autoregressive and moving average terms, and the one which best fitted the 
historical exchange rate data was chosen. 
3.4 Data 
This study employs data from the South African Reserve Bank as well as from the South Africa 
Survey (2000-2012). Daily Rand/USDollar data is used in both the GARCH analysis and intervention 
analysis. The data which was sourced from the South African Reserve Bank was the daily exchange 
rate data from the beginning of January 2000 until October 2013. 
The ZAR/USD exchange rate was selected for the study for two reasons. Firstly, the US dollar is 
recognised as the international reserve currency (JP Morgan, 2009:1), and thus creates a standard 
benchmark to conduct an analysis on. The second reason why the ZAR/USD exchange was chosen 
is due to the USA being one of South Africa’s biggest trading partners; second in terms of exports 
from South Africa to the USA, and fourth in terms of imports to South Africa (DTI, 2014). 
Strike data was taken from the annual South Africa Survey (2000-2012) as this data was consistent 
and focussed on only the biggest, most significant strikes (in terms of man-days that were lost of 
production to firms whose workers were involved in strike action). This allowed significant strike 
periods to be isolated and investigated. 
Due to the increased occurrence of illegal/unprotected/wildcat strikes in South Africa, they are also 
included in the strike statistics. Thus both protected (legal) and unprotected (illegal) strikes are 
included in the analysis. Bhana (1997) argues for the inclusion of unprotected strikes. Bhana (1997) 
argues that the advent of a strike precipitates negative non-normal returns. This means that the share 
value may decline prior to the announcement of a strike and continue for a significant period after the 
onset, with a significant jump in volatility on actual announcement (Bhana, 1997:47). Additionally, 
Bhana (1997:47) notes that if we consider that these strikes occurred around set bargaining dates and 
are therefore predictable to some extent, then the onset of unprotected, wildcat strikes should cause 
considerably more concern or panic. This may have an even more significant impact on share values, 
as well as the value of the Rand, as negative investor sentiment drives away foreign investors (Bhana, 
1997:47). Put into context with the recent strikes and their wildcat nature, they are potentially more 
harmful and influential to share prices and exchange rate levels. 
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The duration of strikes is especially significant in the context of this study, as it the period over which 
the study tests for changes in volatility and value in the exchange rate. Additionally, the duration of 
the strike will affect its severity, meaning more man hours and production will be lost if the strike is 
over a protracted period. As currency is only traded on exchange during week days and man-days lost 
due to strike action are those during the week (South African Survey, 2000-2012), the data did not 
need to be amended and the complete data set could be used. This ensured that the dummy variables, 
which were constructed using a vector of zeroes for the entire period, except the strike period which 
contained a vector of ones, were accurately defined. However, it is a concern that strikes occurring 
over an extended duration may fail to capture the initial volatility caused by the onset of the strike as 
suggested by Bhana (1997:48). However, is has been argued by Enders (2010:122) and Campbell et 
al. (1997:379) that volatility can vary over time as well as display degrees of persistence. The dummy 
for each individual strike was thus constructed specifically to match the duration of the strike to the 
relevant period in the exchange rate data. In this way, the period over which the strike took place 
could be tested for changing levels and volatility.  
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The strike data which was sourced from South Africa Survey (2000-2012) included 72 strikes for the 
period (12 years), to make an average of six strikes which were covered each year. Some years have 
more strikes than that were examined than others however, this was due to the South Africa Survey 
not covering the same number of strikes in their strike tables each year, while a couple of other strikes 
were omitted from the data due to no further information being available on them i.e. exact dates and 
other necessary information. The period over which the strike data is taken is twelve years (2000-
2012), however the exchange rate data was taken between January 2000 and October 2013. This was 
done to provide a slightly longer period for the analysis as well as to ensure strike statistics fitted well 
within the exchange rate data range. 
Strikes were spread between a number of different sectors, with the majority taking place in the 
mining (37.5%), transport (13.9%), public (9.7%), retail (9.7%), and automotive (8.3%) sectors. The 
total number of days which were lost due to the strikes which were examined amounted to 1,240 (An 
average of 17.22 days per strike), while the total number of man-days lost came to 44,861,290 (an 
average of 623,073 man-days per strike). 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the data and methodology employed in this study. The first section of the 
chapter outlined the various testing techniques and procedures followed, which included examining 
the GARCH and intervention analysis techniques and how they would be used to determine the effects 
that strikes have on the exchange rate. The next section covered the data used and the reasoning 
behind including certain strikes in the testing procedure, as well as certain important characteristics 
of the data, such as which sectors were most likely to be impacted by long-term strikes. The most 
significant strikes in terms of man-days lost in production were used. The total and average duration 
and man-days lost were also noted so as to get a better idea on the nature and magnitude of the strikes 
which took place.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the econometric results obtained from the various regressions conducted on the 
volatility and mean level of the exchange rate in relation to strike action. ARCH effects are discussed 
in Section 4.2, while Section 4.3 contains the results and interpretations for the GARCH analysis 
relating to individual strikes. Section 4.4 outlines the results obtained from the intervention analysis 
and discusses these results in context. Section 4.5 deals with the results from the industry GARCH 
and intervention analyses and discusses the rationale behind some of the results which were obtained. 
It also discusses certain aspects of the testing procedures and the results, and what they mean in 
context with the global economy and investor perceptions. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a summary 
of the chapter. 
4.2   Prerequisites for GARCH  
Before estimating the relevant GARCH models, it is necessary to test for ARCH effects. 
However, before this, the time series must be made stationary and this was done by differencing in 
Eviews. Figure 5 shows the exchange rate series after it was differenced once, and it appears to be 
stationary. The correlogram which was constructed from the stationary time series data was used to 
provide an indication for the appropriate lag structure to use in the regressions. Eventually, an ARMA 
(5, 7) specification was adopted to best fit the data.  
The ARCH LM test results revealed that there are indeed ARCH effects present in the exchange rate 
data. The null hypothesis is that there are no ARCH effects present (Enders, 2010:135), however we 
reject the null hypothesis as the p-value is significant (Prob < 0.1) and the squared residuals of the 
PACF and ACF show significant correlations, indicating that there are indeed ARCH effects 
(heteroskedasticity) present.  In order to ensure that the variance equation which will be used 
throughout the study is correctly specified, one should test the residuals of the mean equation for 
ARCH effects. Eviews was used to test the residuals for ARCH effects. The test indicated that there 
were no ARCH effects in the residuals (Prob > 0.1), meaning that the null hypothesis was accepted 
(failed to reject), and which meant that the model could be used for the purposes of the study. 
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4.3 Strike Specific GARCH Results  
Firstly, it should be noted that all GARCH coefficients were significant at the 1% level. This is 
indicative of GARCH effects being present in the data, meaning that the exchange rate is subject to 
fluctuations based on past deviations in the error term. Due to these effects being present and 
significant, it allows us to assess whether the occurrence of specific events has a significant effect on 
the volatility of the market.  
In terms of the overall view of the results; of the 72 strikes covered between January 2000 and October 
2013, fourteen produced statistically significant figures which showed an impact on the volatility of 
the exchange rate. Nine of the fourteen statistically significant results had negative coefficients, while 
five registered positive coefficients. The effect of these would be either decreased volatility (negative 
coefficient) or increased volatility (positive coefficient). Negative results were found in the mining, 
automotive, education, power, retail, and transport industries, meaning that in essence, these strikes 
reduced the volatility of the exchange rate. The increased volatility of the exchange rate could be 
attributed to strikes in the following industries: mining, transport, security, and retail. Interestingly, 
thirteen of the fourteen significant strikes were due to wages and wage disputes, while the only other 
significant strike was due to a grievance. This shows that the main concern of workers is the amount 
of money they make and is far more likely to be the cause of strike action than other issues such as 
adverse working conditions, safety concerns, or the dismissal of fellow workers. Another point worth 
noting is that the strikes which yielded these results were quite diverse in that the duration over which 
they occurred was anywhere between one and 79 days. It could thus be argued that the period over 
which the strike takes place is not that important in terms of the effect it has on volatility. 
4.3.1 Reduced Volatility Results 
The strikes which yielded a negative coefficient for volatility varied in the extent of the effect they 
had on the exchange rate. Coefficients measured between -0.0257 and -0.9845, which in effect 
translates to a decrease in the volatility of the exchange rate by between 0.9845 units and 0.0257 
units, depending on the particular strike in question. In terms of the significance of the results, all of 
the strikes produced a probability figure for the GARCH component translating to this section of the 
results being highly significant (95% significance level i.e. all p-values are smaller than 0.05). This 
was however not true for all the strike dummy variables, the majority of which failed to produce p-
values in the 90% – 100% level of significance band.  
In terms of expectations, these results (those which produced statistically significant dummy variables 
with negative coefficients) did not conform to conventional literature, where the expectation is for 
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strike action to increase the volatility of the exchange rate. The reasons why these results indicate that 
a decline in volatility occurred will be explored in the Explanation of Results (Section 4.3.3). 
4.3.2 Increased Volatility Results 
The strikes which produced positive coefficients also showed a range in the extent of the effect they 
had on volatility, with coefficients ranging from 0.0869 to a much greater 4.0004. The translation of 
these results is that the strikes caused an increase in the level of volatility by between 0.0869 units 
and 4.0004 units. With regard to the significance of the results, all p-values for the GARCH 
component are smaller than 0.05 and thus probability levels are all also at the 95% significance level. 
P-values for the dummy coefficient were however not all significant, with p-values ranging from 0.00 
(highly significant) to 0.9850 (not significant at all). This suggests that while there were GARCH 
effects present, they could not always be linked with strike action. The explanation of the results will 
be explored in the next section. 
4.3.3 Explanation of Results 
The first strike to produce a statistically significant coefficient for the dummy variable was a strike 
by the Road Freight Employer’s Association employees, which resulted in a loss of 55 000 man-days, 
even though the strike itself only lasted a day. The coefficient suggests a decrease in volatility by 
0.3809 units, which is contrary to expectations.  
Other GARCH regressions which resulted in a decrease in exchange rate volatility were; the Eskom 
strike (24 July 2001, -0.1290), the Automobile Manufacturers Employers Organisation strike (6 
August 2001, -0.0257), Northam Platinum strike (13 August 2001, -0.0272), the Public Service and 
Administration strike (16 September 2004, -0.7368), the Pick ‘n Pay strike (22 July 2005, -0.1050), 
and the Bokoni Platinum strike (1 October 2012, -0.0241). Other than that, the GARCH industry 
regression results for the Mining Industry (4 December 2007, -0.9845) and the Retail Motor Industry 
(1 September 2010, -0.0582) also produced a decrease in exchange rate volatility, however the 
industry results will be discussed at a later stage in the chapter. 
In order to accurately assess these outcomes, the context of the strike as well as the economic 
environment at the time is important aspects to consider. For example, Ampofo et al. (2003:7) note 
that during 2001 the Rand depreciated by 34% against the dollar. This is an important contextual 
point as the period noted by Ampofo et al. (2003:7) produced three statistically significant negative 
GARCH coefficients and one statistically significant positive GARCH coefficient.  
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A theoretical view behind the decrease in volatility adapted from Enders (2010:123) is that generally 
volatility is experienced in clusters, thus a coefficient displaying a negative sign could be found where 
the exchange rate is recovering from a bout of volatility, or in other words, the exchange rate is settling 
to a more constant rate. This situation would occur if the dummy variable was able to capture the end 
of a relatively volatile period and the continuation of a relatively normal trend in the exchange rate, 
which is possible given the unpredictable nature of strikes.  
Due to uncertainty playing a major role in increasing volatility (Bloom, 2009:623), another possible 
reason for a decline in volatility may be that due to the nature of the strike (protected, legal, and 
announced in advance), the expected increase in volatility did not materialise. The strikes which were 
used in the study were essentially a mix of protected and unprotected strikes that depended primarily 
on the number of man-days that were lost of production rather than whether the strike was legal or 
not. In future studies it would be useful to further explore and test this theory to ascertain whether 
there was an appreciable difference in the effects caused by protected vs unprotected strikes, as well 
as the timing of how/when the effects manifest themselves. Additionally, Carlson and Osler (1998:25) 
argue that currency traders and speculators can have the effect of smoothing exchange rate volatility 
at low levels of speculation, while higher levels of speculation increase volatility. This theory could 
be used to support the view that “wildcat” or unprotected strikes have a greater initial impact on the 
volatility of the exchange rate as the market was previously unaware of the intention to strike, and 
also helps explain why certain events (e.g. violence) may cause volatility to suddenly spike. Low 
levels of speculation might thus be able to explain reduced levels of volatility, even after the advent 
of a strike.   
Of the remaining strikes which exhibited negative coefficient results, the two which produced the 
largest negative coefficients were the Public Service and Administration strike (2004, -0.7368) and 
Mining Industry strike (2007, -0.9845). Interesting points worth noting when comparing the two are 
that they were both the same in terms of duration, 1 day, and both had p-values of smaller than 0.01. 
This shows that the regression results were highly significant and that the volatility change over a 
short period of time was able to be successfully captured. It may also provide credence to the view 
held by Bhana (1997) that the biggest changes in volatility occurs in the lead up to the strike, and that 
volatility may in fact be decreasing by the time the strike actually begins (unless it is a wildcat strike).  
The environment within which these entities operate is however different. The Public Service and 
Administration employees are employed by the state, while the Mining Industry consists of private 
and publically owned companies that operate in order to produce profit. The Public Services and 
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Administration strike is thus not expected to have a significant impact on the exchange rate as the 
goods and services of the state are mostly consumed by the local economy. However, the result 
suggests otherwise. Additionally, a strike in the Mining Industry may be expected to have an effect 
on volatility due to its significance in the economy. MiningIQ (2014) notes that mining in South 
Africa contributes around 20% towards South Africa’s GDP, of which around 50% are direct 
contributions. The mining industry is also exposed to the exchange rate through the export of its 
products to other countries, this would make it more susceptible to fluctuations in the exchange rate 
and may be the reason why the Mining Industry strike in 2007 caused the largest decline in the 
Rand/Dollar exchange rate.   
The 2001 strike which produced a positive coefficient, and thus increased the volatility of the 
exchange rate, materialised at Samancor; a chrome and manganese producing company. The 
increased volatility could be due to a number of factors. Firstly, with a depreciating exchange rate 
(Ampofo et al., 2003:7) and with South Africa holding 75% of chrome reserves (Tharisa, 2014), there 
may have been some major concerns as to the future supply of chrome, as well as the price it would 
be available at. This may have sparked concern by investors, which resulted in a spike in volatility. 
The strike at Equity Aviation caused an increase in volatility by 0.5506 units. The strike itself 
involved only 800 employees and continued for almost three months, resulting in the loss of 63 200 
man-days. Volatility stemming from this strike could possibly be attributed to the nature of the 
services provided by the company. Equity Aviation (2014) details the services it offers as ground 
handling, permits, fuel, charters, cargo, and aviation security. The company offers these services to 
the internationally linked airlines industry. If the services were to be suspended for such an extended 
duration due to strike action, concern and volatility may have arisen on these concerns. 
Another strike which led to increased volatility was the South Africa National Security Employer’s 
Association strike, which saw a massive loss in man-days (1 280 000). The importance of this strike 
is due firstly to the massive scale, and secondly as it involved security companies who provide 
important protection and services throughout the country. Enders (2010:143) notes that risk increases 
volatility. The increase in volatility could thus be attributed to increased concern about increasing 
risk levels (unsystematic risk, and more precisely; foreign exchange rate risk, political risk, and 
market risk). 
The last two strikes which resulted in increased volatility in the Rand/USDollar exchange rate 
involved Woolworths; a food and clothing retailer, and Pamodzi Mining, the resources arm of 
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Pamodzi Group. Both of these strikes occurred in the latter stages of 2008, which is worth mentioning 
due to the economic environment at the time. The Economist (2013) notes that when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed in September 2008, it almost brought down the global financial system. This 
resulted in a global credit crunch which made it difficult to access credit facilities and made financial 
institutions very wary with regards to granting loans. The decline in the value of the Rand relative to 
the Dollar spiked in September 2008 (see Figure. 3), and may have played a role in the increased 
volatility captured by the GARCH regressions for Pamodzi and Woolworths. If one was to consider 
the economic environment in which these strikes took place (global financial crisis), one would 
conclude that due to the Rand being more vulnerable, any additional problematic occurrences like 
strikes would have a more significant effect on the volatility of the Rand exchange rate.  
4.3.4 Marikana 
The Marikana strike which started on the 10th of August 2012 might be seen as an important strike in 
terms of the international exposure it received due to the violence and deaths surrounding it, however 
it failed to produce a statistically significant coefficient for the strike dummy. There are a number of 
reasons why this may have been the case. The first factor could be that as there were a number of 
strikes around this period (nine between the beginning of August 2012 and the end of October 2012), 
which may have erased or hidden the specific volatility created by the strike in question. The second 
factor has to do with timing. If one observes the ZAR/USD exchange rate for 2012 (Figure 5), there 
is actually a slight appreciation of the Rand following the start of the strike, before a large depreciatory 
trend begins on the 14th of August 2012 and ultimately continues for the duration of the month. In 
terms of timing, the strike started on the 10th, however, people only really started paying attention to 
it a few days later, when stories of violence started to emerge. News24 (2012) notes that between the 
12th and 14th of August, ten people were killed in the violence, two of them security guards. This was 
before the 16th of August, when 34 miners were shot dead by police. By the time the Lonmin strike 
ended, strikes in the agricultural sector, as well as at Anglo Platinum were under way. Thus if one 
wanted to isolate the volatility caused by Marikana specifically, it would be necessary to test volatility 
for the periods during the strike where the biggest impact might be expected, i.e. the initial stages 
where the majority of deaths occurred. 
4.4 Intervention Analysis: Strike specific 
There were only four strikes which significantly affected the level of the Rand/Dollar exchange rate. 
The first two significant events in question concern the strikes at Delta Motors in the automotive 
industry, which began on the 22nd of September 2003, and the strike at Harmony Gold Mine which 
commenced on the 11th of February 2004. The intervention analysis of the Delta Motors strike 
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produced a coefficient for the dummy variable of -0.8402 with a 5% level of significance. The direct 
effect of the intervention would cause an appreciation of the exchange rate by 0.8402 units and 
increase the value of the Rand by 0.8403 units in the long run. However, it does not conform to the 
expectations provided by the literature that suggests a depreciation following a strike should rather 
take place. The Harmony Gold Mine strike also yielded a negative coefficient of -1.4517 with a 5% 
level of significance. This suggests that the strike caused a direct appreciation of the Rand by 1.4517 
units and increased the long term value of the Rand by 1.4337 units. This result also did not conform 
to the expectations of a reduction in the value of the Rand. 
The other two significant results occur on the 13th of April 2006 and the 17th of September 2008. The 
dummy variable for the strike which took place on the 13th of April strike was positive (0.2408) at a 
10% level of significance, and is related to a strike in the security industry concerning the South 
African National Security Employer's Association (Sansea). The presence of a positive coefficient 
indicates that the effect on the exchange rate would be a direct depreciation to the value of 0.24077 
units, while the long run effect would be a depreciation of 0.24082 units. The dummy variable for the 
Woolworths strike which took place on the 17th of September 2008 had a statistically significant, 
positive coefficient. The relevant dummy variable had a coefficient of 1.1344, suggesting that the 
direct effect of the intervention was a depreciation of the Rand by 1.1344 units while the long term 
effect is a depreciation of 1.1264 units. 
Possible reasons for an appreciation of the Rand following strike action depend on the context of the 
strike. It is worth noting that the duration over which the strikes took place was important in 
determining whether the respective dummy variables were either positive or negative. The strikes 
which resulted in an appreciation of the exchange rate were of 3 and 7 days in duration respectively 
and took place in 2003 and 2004, while the strikes which caused a depreciation of the exchange rate 
were of a longer duration; 53 and 27 days respectively, and took place in 2006 and 2008. This may 
indicate that shorter strikes do not have a negative impact on the exchange rate and instead result in 
an appreciation of the Rand, while longer strikes are perceived with more negativity and are expected 
to have a greater impact on the economy in terms of costs associated with strike action. Additionally, 
the longer strike periods resulted in a much greater loss in man-days for Woolworths (405 000) and 
Sansea (1 280 000) compared to the Delta (21 000) and Harmony (13 500) strikes. 
If we consider the period over which these strikes occur (Figure 3), one would observe that between 
2002 and 2004 the Rand was gaining in strength against the dollar. This is in line with the results, 
which suggested that the strikes caused an appreciation of the Rand over the period in which they 
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took place. This is not to say that the strikes were the major cause of the appreciation, but that that 
they possibly played a part in contributing towards the strengthening of the Rand. The opposite is 
true for the 2006 and 2008 strike period, where the rand was weakening against the dollar. The results 
from the Sansea and Woolworths strikes thus fit the general trend of the exchange rate for the period. 
What this may suggest is that the overall trend in the exchange rate market may have enhanced or 
reduced the effects created by the strikes. Economicshelp (2015) notes that there are seven key ways 
in which an exchange rate can appreciate. These are; an increase in interest rates, lower inflation, 
increased competitiveness, expectations of appreciation, current account surplus, high economic 
growth, and the buying of the currency. The only two which might apply are the current account 
surplus (2002/2003) and/or a greater demand for the Rand. Due to the current account only 
experiencing a surplus for around a year, we can exclude it as much of the test data lies outside that 
range. Therefore, the only reason for the currency to appreciate is due to an increased demand for the 
Rand. This supports the observations earlier that the appreciation or depreciation caused by the strikes 
may instead just be the underlying trend in the exchange rate at the time. There is no evidence which 
could be found that suggested a strike could cause an appreciation of the exchange rate on its own.  
When comparing the individual strikes, the sectors that they belong to are also worth considering. 
What is worth noting is that the individual strikes in the various sectors produced different results. 
Individual strikes in the mining and automotive industries caused the value of the Rand to rise, while 
strikes in the security and retail industries caused the value of the Rand to fall. These results are 
contrary to expectations as one would expect the sectors with the most exposure to the exchange rate 
be the worst affected from strike action (Melvin and Tan, 1996:330). Additionally, with the Rand 
strengthening the export focused sectors (Mining and Automotive) may not perform quite as well as 
expected with a weaker Rand. The two strikes which caused a depreciation in the Rand occurred in 
the Security and Retail sectors. As mentioned before, these strikes were of a longer duration than the 
others and as such had more time to create a negative perception in the market. The security sector 
strike is especially relevant as this sector provides security to operations with high value, and as such 
posed a significant risk to assets should the dispute continue or become more violent. Schroeder 
(2006) noted that striking security guards and community members looted shops and disrupted 
business during the Easter weekend. This may be indicative of the type of behaviour by strikers that 
causes a negative perception in the media and results in a depreciation of the Rand. Abrahams (2008) 
argued that the strike at Woolworths was due to the employment structure, with a large percentage of 
the workforce (70%) being casual employees. This caused strife as employment security was low and 
employees believed that their rights were not being met (Abrahams, 2008).  
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4.5 Industry: GARCH and Intervention Analyses Results 
Of the seven industry/sector groupings (automotive, education, public, mining, retail, textiles, and 
transport), three of the seven had strikes which had an impact on the volatility of the exchange rate. 
These are the automotive (-0.01541), mining (-0.0137) and transport (+0.0510) sectors. The 
interpretation of these coefficients is that strikes in the automotive and mining industries would 
reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, while strikes in the transport industry would increase the 
volatility. In terms of exports, mining export values contributed 25.3% to the total export value of 
R926.8 billion in 2014, while the automotive sector contributed 9.5% towards the total (DTI, 2014). 
Additionally, while the transport sector is not necessarily an exporter, its contribution to delivering 
goods from centres of production to ports is significantly important. This may be expected due to the 
importance of these sectors with regard to international trade and their contributions to the effective, 
efficient delivery of products in the market. Kaggwa (2011:1) notes that the automotive sector has 
been an object of emphasis in South Africa’s economy for the past decade as international firms such 
as Volkswagen and Toyota have found South Africa as a useful staging area for producing vehicles 
as well as providing a useful market for their products. Kaggwa (2011:2) suggest that the South 
African government has put significant emphasis on this sector as a potential job provider for many 
people. Allix and Gernetzky (2013) argue that this has exposed the sector to politics and strife as 
workers seek to gain a larger proportion of the perceived profits by demanding above-inflation wage 
increases.  
Media Club South Africa (2014) noted that with the growth of South Africa’s tertiary and secondary 
industries, as well as a fall in the production of gold, the contribution of mining to South Africa’s 
GDP has fallen over the last few decades. However, it was also noted by Media Club South Africa 
(2014) that this decrease may well be offset by a growth in the beneficiated and downstream minerals 
industry. The transport industry is an important aspect of any country’s economy as it provides the 
means to deliver products to and from ports. This makes it a key component in the economy and thus 
affects the efficient delivery of products and services in South Africa. These two points provide 
context for assessing the impact of strikes in the mining and transport industries. Mining, while still 
a significant contributor to GDP, is no longer the cornerstone of the economy as it once was. The 
transport industry however, has the important role of connecting South Africa’s industries with the 
domestic economy as well as the rest of the world.  
The other sectors (education, public, retail, and textiles) are perhaps not as internationally linked as 
the three sectors (mining, transport, and automotive) which contribute a significant amount to South 
Africa’s trade balance through exports (Media Club South Africa, 2014). Education is essentially 
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more of a domestically consumed good and does not have the same characteristics as tradable items 
such as gold, vehicles and oil. One would thus expect that strikes in the education sector, while a 
concern to the South African public, do not have a direct link to foreign investment and perceptions 
regarding South African stocks and companies. With regard to the public sector, one may expect a 
more volatile response due to bond offerings and returns, however it seems that due to the long term 
nature of bonds and their characteristic of essentially being “risk-free” (Howells and Bain, 2008:322), 
investors are more concerned with changes in the prime interest rate than whether or not civil servants 
go on strike. Another view that could be taken and is offered by Bhana (1998:43) is that to strike and 
public displays of dissention are a constitutional right and are thus indicative of a healthy democracy, 
however this theory is not supported by the evidence (strikes effect the exchange rate) and could be 
considered outdated.  
In this analysis, the retail sector incorporates strikes that have occurred in various retail chains such 
as Pick ‘n Pay and Shoprite Checkers as well as the cleaning industries. Thomas White International 
(2011) notes that the retail sector in South Africa is import-driven, and is thus dependent on the 
exchange rate for making purchases abroad, rather than exporting goods and earning foreign 
exchange.  
Another defining characteristic of the retail sector is that the goods are sold mostly in the domestic 
market. This means that local producers and consumers are most affected by strikes. Fedderke and 
Schaling (2005) note that mark-ups of prices in South Africa are 30% compared to 10% in the USA, 
which could have a profound influence on negating the negative shocks/wage increases caused by 
strikes in this sector, as there is a higher margin of profitability available. The same could be said of 
textiles. International Trade Centre (2010:1-9) notes that textiles in South Africa have faced a rather 
grim past, with cheap Chinese goods eroding market share and making it difficult for domestic 
producers to compete. The textiles industry in South Africa is thus mainly a domestic one and is not 
a large contributor to GDP or foreign exchange. International Trade Centre (2010:1) additionally 
notes that strength of the Rand is an issue for the domestic firms as it makes South African textiles 
less competitive abroad. Thus, while imports of foreign produced textiles have grown since 2005, 
exports of South African textiles products have significantly declined (International Trade Centre, 
2010:6). This would suggest that the strength of the Rand has a far greater effect on the industry, than 
the industry has on the Rand. 
The sectors which showed significant results that suggest a change in the volatility of the Rand 
following strikes, are the automotive, mining and transport sectors. These results can be found in 
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Table 4. The automotive sector dummy registered a coefficient of -0.0154 with a level of significance 
just above 10% (probability value of 0.1044), which is both negative and borderline significant. This 
suggests that strikes in the automotive sector reduce the volatility of the Rand in the foreign exchange 
market by 0.0154 units. This does not conform to expectations. However, South Africa’s automotive 
industry, while producing for the local market, also produces a large number of vehicles for export. 
Many of the parts are imported before assembly and so there is a flux of components and vehicles in 
and out of the country. The reduced volatility may thus stem from operations being suspended (due 
to strike action) which led to a decrease in speculation or hedging activity in the foreign exchange 
market. Another explanation is that investors/speculators had already decided what effect the strike 
may have on the industry, made their decisions, and are patiently waiting for the strike to end. Bhana 
(1997:48) argues that with strikes there is also usually uncertainty regarding the expected duration of 
the strike and that strikes which continue for an extended duration are usually more costly. Thus, as 
a strike goes on, the potential for it to create losses for investors increases. This would make it difficult 
for investors to assume what the actual effects on the industry will be at the onset of the strike, and 
may explain why levels of volatility differ between strikes and over the duration of the strike. 
The mining industry dummy is perhaps the most surprising result, registering a coefficient of -0.0137 
with a level of significance just below the 10% level (probability value of 0.0958). This could be 
interpreted as being weakly significant, and that a mining industry strike would reduce the volatility 
of the Rand in the foreign exchange market. This does not conform to expectations, as due to mining 
being one of South Africa’s greatest contributors to GDP and earners of foreign exchange (Kaggwa, 
2011), one might expect a mining industry strike to increase the volatility of the Rand as uncertainty 
regarding the value of the Rand and South African stock prices increases. 
The first possible reason for this result is that the period over which the dummy variables are 
employed is too long. The explanation for the period which the dummy variable captures as possibly 
being too long is that if there is a strike for an extended period, one might fail to capture the initial 
cluster of volatility which is produced (Enders, 2010:123). This would mean that the increased 
volatility would be focussed, for a short period, around the initial date of the strike. This would also 
depend on whether the strike was announced in advance or whether it was a wildcat strike. An 
argument for the strike dummies being too short also holds some merit. Gleditsch and Maestas 
(1998:6) argue that volatility may persist over time instead of flaring and abruptly adjusting back to 
and contextual changes. This would suggest that if there was already volatility in the market, the 
impact of the strike may have little noticeable difference in terms of the volatility of the exchange 
rate. The characteristics of the strike are also important to consider; if the event is a sudden, violent, 
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wildcat strike one might expect a short period of volatility (Bhana 1997:48). Prolonged volatility 
would occur if there was constant speculation within the market regarding the outlook on the strike, 
or if there were intermittent events (e.g. violence, breakdown of relations between bargaining parties, 
sympathy strikes) during the period of the strike which caused volatility to spike. The volatility 
dummy variables used in this study managed to capture changing levels of volatility over both short 
and extended periods, so it is difficult to say for certain whether extending or decreasing the period 
over which they were used would have led to better results.   
This would mean that the economic effects from the strike (lost production and revenue, increased 
wages and operating costs, as well as inflation) would be lagged, and may only begin to be noticed 
after more time has elapsed (Chaudhary and Shrestha, 2013:18; Maswanganyi, 2014; Mail and 
Guardian, 2013). Additionally, as noted before, the actual strike duration is not known when the strike 
commences, so investors must make a choice and either hold on to their stocks or reduce their 
exposure by selling off the stocks. Investors may also simply shift their funds from the mining 
industry into a more profitable or stable one, such as real estate, pharmaceuticals or bonds. This would 
not cause a significant change in the level or volatility of the exchange rate. 
The transport industry dummy produces a coefficient of 0.0510 with a probability value of 0.0559 
(statistically significant at the 10% level). This would translate into a strike in the transport industry 
causing the volatility of the Rand to increase by 0.0510 units; a result which conforms to initial 
expectations. The transport industry plays a major role in transporting goods and services around the 
country. Marrian (2012) notes that a strike in this sector affects all other industries as it influences the 
fuel supply, the delivery of goods to and from their places of production to consumers as well as the 
international market. By preventing the delivery of fuel, labourers cannot get to their places of work, 
products cannot be delivered, and consumers/producers cannot purchase what they need. This, 
combined with the non-delivery of goods means shops run low on consumables, warehousing costs 
mount and perishable goods spoil. Transport strikes effectively bring the economy to a labouring halt 
and a compromising position. An increase in the volatility of the Rand is thus expected as Chaudhary 
and Shrestha (2013) and Marrian (2012) note that not just the strike-affected industry is affected, but 
also those which rely on the industry for product delivery.  
The results for the intervention analysis (when conducted across industries) yielded only one 
borderline significant result. This was for the retail industry and a coefficient for the dummy variable 
was registered as 0.1361 with a probability value of 0.1172. This result would suggest that the direct 
result of a strike in the retail industry was a 0.0136 unit decrease in the value of the Rand and the long 
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term effect is a 0.1432 unit decrease in the value of the Rand. This result conforms to the expectations 
discussed in the literature review where it was noted that strikes should generally cause the value of 
a currency to depreciate.  
What is interesting is that of the seven sectors tested for a change in the value of the Rand, only the 
retail sector produced a (weakly) significant result which showed that a strike would decrease the 
value of the Rand relative to the US Dollar. Other sectors such as the Automotive, Mining, Transport 
and Textiles, which one might expect to yield significant results, did not. If one observes the 
individual results one would note that all of the strikes relating to the retail industry, bar the 
Woolworths one, produce a negative coefficient for their respective dummy variables (even though 
they are statistically insignificant). This would suggest that the retail dummy as a representative for 
the industry as a whole is dominated by the Woolworths result (which produced a significant, 
depreciatory result in the individual tests). If the test is accurate, and strikes in the retail industry do 
indeed cause a depreciation of the Rand, then the expectations discussed earlier would be fulfilled 
and we could conclude that strikes in the Retail sector have a negative effect on the value of the Rand. 
The reason why strikes may have an effect contrary to expectations could be that investors pursue 
different strategies. Fedderke and Schaling (2005) discovered that mark-ups in South Africa are far 
larger than those in many developed economies. The reasons they gave for this is that inflation is 
expected to be higher and the margin for profit is thus 30% compared to that of the USA where it is 
10%. Increased profit margins, even if they come with the higher risk associated with labour costs, 
may have an influence on investment decisions i.e. investors may choose to hold the risky stock in 
expectation of greater returns further down the line. This would have mean that the strike would have 
little impact on the volatility of the exchange rate. However, the generic view of the relationship 
between strikes and inflation has been discussed in detail in the literature review, as well as in the 
South African Reserve Bank Factsheets (SARB, 2012a, 2012b) with the general conclusion being 
that strikes and inflation are linked through increasing wages and therefore costs. An investor who 
held this latter view may be more risk averse and therefore inclined to move their assets elsewhere. 
Addionally, Carlson and Osler (1998:25) argue that speculation can influence the exchange rate in 
different ways, depending on the level of speculation and different views held by market participants. 
This would imply that contrary expectations are possible, especially when there is a degree of 
speculation in the market. 
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4.6 Summary 
Both individual and industry strike dummies were constructed to assess the effect of strikes on the 
volatility and mean level of the Rand/US Dollar exchange rate. For the individual GARCH analysis, 
only a few of the regression results proved significant and conformed to the expectations of increasing 
the volatility of the exchange rate. Other significant results yielded coefficients that suggested a 
decline in volatility was caused by the strike action. The dummy variable and the appropriate period 
of a strike it should cover was also discussed. This was due to a concern that the dummy variable may 
not be able to capture very short term volatility clusters if the dummy covers an extended period, or 
that a dummy variable which covers a short duration may miss volatility effects which occur outside 
the defined period.  
Most of the regression results for the GARCH analysis dummy variables are insignificant with 
varying coefficient signs. Bhana (1997:48) notes that the beginning of a strike is the period which is 
usually associated with abnormal, statistically significant, negative returns with regard to share prices. 
This has important implications with regard to the efficiency of information in the market and how 
investors may respond. Since the volatility of the Rand was measured over the whole duration of the 
strike, instead of a short period around the initial onset of the strike, the lack of significant results 
might be attributed to this.  
Overall, the regression results for the GARCH dummy variable were mainly insignificant. Of the 72 
regressions, there were only fourteen which indicated that a strike had an effect on exchange rate 
volatility. Nine of the dummy variables were statistically significant and had negative coefficients, 
which is to say that the strike would decrease the volatility in the foreign exchange market for the 
Rand and defy the expectations. Thus only five of the results of the 72 adhered to expectations and 
increased volatility in the market. Additionally, of the seven industry GARCH regressions only three 
produced (weakly) significant results (automotive, mining and transport), and only one of these with 
a positive coefficient (transport).  
The results for the individual intervention analysis produced fewer significant results than the 
GARCH analysis. There were a few strikes (two out of four) which conformed to expectations by 
causing a depreciation of the Rand. There were also a number of results which suggested that the 
strike caused an appreciation of the Rand. In the majority of cases however, it was found that strikes 
did not have a statistically significant impact on either the value or volatility of the exchange rate, 
suggesting that the level and volatility of the Rand in the foreign exchange market is not very sensitive 
to strike actions. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to explore whether labour strikes in South Africa have an impact on 
the value and volatility of the Rand. In order to do this a number of econometric regressions were 
carried out using Rand/Dollar exchange rate data to try and identify which strikes were significant in 
influencing the value and/or the volatility of the Rand. Literature regarding the various effects and 
characteristics of strikes was reviewed to gain a better understanding of the existing ideas surrounding 
the topic, as well as to help in interpreting the results of the regressions. 
The literature review explored how strikes affect the rest of the economy (micro and macro factors) 
and identified various challenges which arise due to strike action. Strikes were seen to increase 
inflation, increase costs, and cause a decline in investor confidence. The conventional view which 
emerged was that strikes should cause an increase in the volatility of the exchange rate, as well as to 
reduce the value at which the local currency trades (depreciation). Volatility is seen to increase due 
to a greater level of perceived risk, and the value is seen to decline due to the same reason, combined 
with lower levels of productivity relative to cost and higher inflation. Additionally, it was found that 
there was a link between the returns on shares listed on the local bourse and the level and volatility 
of the exchange rate. This explains that shares traded on the exchange could have an impact on the 
level and volatility of the Rand, meaning that listed companies which are exposed to strikes may have 
an impact on the volatility/level of the Rand through the trading of their shares. 
A GARCH and intervention analysis was conducted for the periods of strike action relating to the 
most significant strikes for each year from 2000 until 2012. “Significant” strikes were judged to be 
those where the greatest amount of production was lost due to strikers not being at work. The phrase 
“man-days” refers to the amount of work a typical worker is expected to get done in a day. The strikes 
were separated into seven broad categories: automotive, education, mining, public, retail, textiles and 
transport, for the additional purpose of an industry analysis. In total, a number of 72 strikes were 
investigated between January 2000 and October 2013. Of these, fourteen showed statistically 
significant results when subjected to a GARCH analysis, while only four registered significant 
intervention analysis results. The majority of statistically significant GARCH results did not conform 
to the expectations that a strike would cause an increase in volatility, while the significant results in 
the intervention analysis were mixed in that some of the results suggested that the value of the Rand 
would decrease (as expected), while other suggested an appreciation of the Rand. One could thus 
conclude that strikes are not as significant as one might expect to the South African exchange rate.. 
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However, due to the changing nature of volatility (sometimes persistent, sometimes occurring in brief 
clusters) and the multitude of factors which influence the level of the exchange rate, it is difficult to 
interpret the results with absolute certainty.  
When considering the effects which strikes may have on foreign investors’ investment, it is important 
to note that foreign investment has been shown to be mostly denominated by holdings in South 
African government bonds (Porter, 2013:4). Since bonds are known to increase in value with a falling 
interest rate as well as their long term nature, foreign investors may not be particularly concerned 
with a strike occurring, unless there is a sudden fall in the value of the Rand or interest rates are 
expected to be increased. Since only four of the strikes showed any significance in the individual 
strike analysis with regard to influencing the mean level of the exchange rate, with two showing an 
appreciation of the Rand and two showing a depreciation, strikes may be regarded as being relatively 
unimportant to many foreign investors. However, in the industry tests, the intervention analysis 
results indicated that strikes in the Retail sector would cause a fall in the value of the Rand, thus 
conforming to expectations.  
Another factor has been the role of international events such as quantitative easing, which officially 
began in March 2009. It was noted by Porter (2013:4) that quantitative easing in the USA has a 
significant effect on investment decisions. Rumours that it could come to an end creates risk for 
international investors and may result in them turning away from developing markets to more 
developed markets which are viewed as more secure and less risky. The analogy of “herd behaviour” 
plays a role here, with investors disinvesting from South Africa in the advent of political or social 
tensions (in this case strikes) as they do not wish to be the last to do so. The financial crisis which 
began in 2007 and gained steam in 2008 is also an example that is very important in a global risk 
context. The year 2008 produced three significant results, all of which conformed to expectations i.e. 
the two GARCH results (Woolworths and Pamodzi Mining) showed increased volatility, while the 
intervention analysis (Woolworths) showed a significant depreciation in the value of the Rand. While 
these are important results as they add credence to the expectations (increased volatility and decreased 
value) noted in the literature, there are also alternate views which should be considered. The first is 
that the regressions (both GARCH and intervention analysis) may have simply captured the trends 
created by the unstable macroeconomic environment at the time. The other view supported by OECD 
(2009:3) is that the effects created by the strikes may have been emphasised by the negative 
macroeconomic perceptions at the time, and thus made the impact created by the strikes more evident. 
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The next conclusion revolves around the dummy variables which were used in the various GARCH 
and intervention analysis regressions. As noted in the interpretation of the GARCH and Intervention 
Analysis results, there are concerns surrounding the appropriate duration the dummy variable should 
cover in order to best capture the effects of a strike. Bhana (1997) produces a strong argument in 
favour of a short dummy with regards to volatility testing. This would mean that the dummy variable 
would only be constructed for a few days around the immediate strike date. However, even with a 
dummy variable constructed over a longer period, some significant results could be found using the 
GARCH analysis. This may be indicative of prolonged volatility in some industries, as well as 
increased uncertainty about the outcome of the strike as it extends in duration and bargaining councils 
fail to reach an agreement.  
The intervention analysis dummy has also been identified as an area of contention. This is due to the 
effects of a strike not immediately dissipating when the strike ends. As discussed previously, “knock-
on” effects may exist that continue to haunt the strike affected company/industry, as well as the 
industries which are linked to it long after the strike has been concluded. These effects could be in 
the guise of increased costs, interest payments on debt, lost production, inflation, unemployment and 
uncertainty linked to the future of the industries in question (SARB, 2012a:2-3). This could indicate 
that the effects on the level of the Rand caused by strikes take much longer to materialise, and if they 
were to be properly measured a longer period may need to be considered. The limitations relating to 
the study are further discussed later in the chapter.  
The decision to only analyse the immediate effect that a specific strike had on the exchange was taken 
due to the complicated nature of exchange rates, especially over extended durations. As noted in 
earlier sections, there are many factors which can and do influence exchange rate behaviour. 
Separating the actual effect caused by the strike from all the other variables over an extended period 
would be difficult indeed, and would require extensive further research to understand all the factors 
at play and how to adequately account for them. Thus the decision was made to cover only the 
duration of the strike in an attempt to capture the more immediate effects. 
The regressions which were conducted that included all the strikes in a certain industry may be 
influenced in a similar fashion by the length/specification of the dummy variable as those tests which 
investigated each strike individually. This is due to the industry tests using a combination of all the 
dummies for the strikes which took place in the specific industry. The results suggest that that mining 
and automotive strikes reduce the volatility while the transport strikes increase the volatility, while 
the intervention analysis for the various industries suggest that retail strikes cause a depreciation of 
   
46 
 
the exchange rate. This makes it difficult to interpret the results as one would not usually expect 
strikes in the mining and automotive industries to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, as many 
news articles in financial sections blame strikes for increased uncertainty and for creating a negative 
view of the Rand. Increased uncertainty would mean that the typical risk adverse investor would 
disinvest, which should increase volatility, as is indicated by Melvin and Tan (1996). Reasons for the 
Transport industry producing a positive coefficient in the Industry GARCH regression as opposed to 
a negative one would mean that volatility over the period increases. The reason why volatility may 
seem to be prolonged in this industry while not in other industries is that the transport industry is very 
central to the whole economy and therefore its effects on different sectors in the economy take time 
to occur, which may make investors wary of the spill-over effects impacting their investments (Allix 
and Gernetzky, 2013). The only intervention analysis regression which achieved a significant 
coefficient for the industry analysis was regarding the Retail industry, which produced a positive 
coefficient and thus indicated that strikes in the retail industry cause a depreciation of the Rand. This 
result supports the theory that strikes result in a decrease in the value of the local currency. 
In final conclusion, while most of the regressions produced insignificant results, there were a number 
of interesting findings. Firstly, by achieving significant results in some of the regressions, it proves 
that some strikes do indeed have an impact on the exchange rate. This impact may be an increase or 
decrease in the relative volatility or the value of the Rand. Secondly, it has highlighted that some 
sectors may be more exposed to the exchange rate than others, i.e. the automotive, mining and 
transport sectors may have a greater impact on the volatility of the exchange rate, while the retail 
sector has a greater impact on the value of the Rand. Some sectors (those with a more international 
context i.e. mining, automotive, transport and retail) seem to be more sensitive to the perceptions of 
investors than others. This conforms to expectations as it is these foreign-linked industries that 
produce much of South Africa’s foreign exchange income. It must also be noted that it is the belief 
of many that strikes cause adverse effects in the economy relating to increased uncertainty and costs, 
as is evidenced in (Allix and Gernetzky, 2013; News24, 2012a; News24, 2013b; OECD, 2013). These 
perceptions, as displayed in local and international media, certainly play a role in determining the 
volume of investments within an economy. The fact that most foreign investment is currently tied up 
in government bonds (Porter, 2013:4) may also be suggestive that post-crisis investments by foreign 
investors prefer the relatively risk-free option of bonds than the swings associated with the stock 
market and South Africa’s restive labour unions. 
Thus, it can be said that while not all strikes have the potential to have a significant impact on the 
value and volatility of the exchange rate, there are a few which have the characteristics to do so. The 
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expectations that were created by the literature review that the effect of strike action is an increase in 
the volatility and a depreciation of the exchange rate does not hold true for all cases. Most of the 
GARCH regressions that produced statistically significant results also indicated that a reduction in 
volatility was the result of the strike, and not the expected increase in volatility. However, the 
intervention analysis was slightly more in line with the expectations that strikes would cause a 
depreciation of the Rand. Two of the four significant results achieved in the intervention analysis for 
individual strikes (Sansea and Woolworths) resulted in a depreciation of the Rand, while the only 
significant industry intervention analysis result (retail industry) also showed a fall in the value of the 
Rand. The support for strikes causing a depreciation of the Rand is thus slightly stronger than the 
evidence behind the increased volatility theory. On a final note, it was found that the intervention 
analysis results were in line with the economic trends at the time (appreciating during the “boom” 
years, and depreciating in the “bad/crisis” stricken years). This may have been due to the economic 
environment at the time emphasising the effects of the strikes. Additionally, three of the significant 
GARCH results occurred during the financial crisis of 2008. This may indicate that the economic 
environment at the time also had an effect on volatility and may also have exacerbated the results.  
5.2 Possible Limitations 
A number of limitations should be noted, particularly related to the construction of dummies and the 
intervention analysis. The dummy periods extend from the onset of the strike until its conclusion. 
They were constructed in this way so as to ascertain whether the period over which the strike occurred 
caused a change in the volatility of the Rand and if the long run mean of the exchange rate was 
affected by these strikes. Concerns pertaining to using the same dummy variable for both the GARCH 
and intervention analyses are that, according to Bhana (1997:48), it is the beginning of the strike that 
shows the most significant changes in volatility. It was also noted that abnormal returns occurred 
before the strike was announced. Additionally, Enders (2009:123) argues that volatility occurs over 
periods and is not constant over time, this would suggest that volatility may increase for a period 
before the series would then revert to its mean level.  
Thus, while it can be difficult to determine the exact periods when volatility will be most evident, 
employing a dummy variable that covers the entire duration of the strike should have the most chance 
in capturing any volatility which occurs. Additionally, the tests which were conducted did find 
statistically significant GARCH coefficients for strikes which took place over an extended duration. 
This would support the theory by Enders (2010:122) that suggests volatility can be persistent.  
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What may help increase the accuracy of the tests is a more in depth look at the characteristics of the 
strike, which would help determine which periods within the duration of the strike should be expected 
to create the greatest change in the volatility of the exchange rate. This idea was inspired by Bhana 
(1997) who noted that the greatest volatility occurs around the onset of the strike. With strikes in 
South Africa sometimes occurring over an extended duration; for example: the Lonmin/Marikana 
strike lasted 29 working days (News24, 2012a), analysing specific periods of the strike may provide 
valuable insights into the specific nature of volatility in the exchange rate due to strike action. 
Analysing periods of strikes linked to violence and death, as suggested by Melvin and Tan 
(1996:340), would also increase the chances of detecting significant changes in volatility levels. This 
creates a limitation for the study as this theory was not originally incorporated in the testing 
procedure. Future research should incorporate this theory in order to more accurately assess the 
impact of strikes. 
Another important consideration relates to legal and illegal strikes. Bhana (1997:48) notes that if a 
strike is announced by unions in advance, investors may not wait for the strike to actually occur before 
disinvesting. This may result in volatility increasing or the value of the Rand depreciating before the 
strike actually begins. On the other hand, wildcat strikes are not announced in advance, and investors 
may only notice a strike once it is announced on the news. This may have the effect of delaying the 
volatility until the onset of the strike.  
Intervention analysis produces another set of limitations. These concerns revolve also around the 
duration of the period of the intervention dummy. As mentioned before, the dummy variable covers 
the entire period of the strike. Thus, for the dummy to be statistically significant there must be a 
sustained change in the mean value of the exchange rate that coincides directly with the strike 
duration. Chaudhary and Shrestha (2013:18) suggest that the economic effects of a strike can take a 
while to manifest (one to two months with regard to inflation). The concern surrounding this issue is 
that, the effects of the strike may take longer to manifest due to the nature of economic environment. 
Western Union (2014) note that companies that are exposed to international markets generally utilize 
hedging and risk neutralising strategies that cover a company’s risk profile months in advance, this 
means that companies which may have exposure to currency risk, market risk, and political risk. 
It was earlier argued by Bhana (1997) that volatility related to strikes may well only last a few days 
around the initial start of the strike. If there was indeed a change in the mean it would either occur 
directly following the volatile period due to a sudden jump or fall in the value spurred by the volatility 
or economic fundamentals, or over a far longer duration as companies struggle to manage their costs, 
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as well as the knock-on effect strikes have on domestic market. The automotive strike for example 
may influence domestic steel and parts producers, while the transport strikes may have an effect on 
costs pertaining to most industries that need to store and transport goods. The granting of credit by 
banks and other financial institutions may well aid these businesses in riding out the initial storm (of 
costs), however these need to be paid back over time and at interest. This would theoretically reduce 
growth prospects as instead of embarking on profitable ventures and employing more labour and 
hence contributing more positively to economic growth, businesses are forced to pay back costly, 
interest bearing loans (Business Day, 2014).  
For the intervention analysis, therefore, the dummy variables should perhaps be either shorter or much 
longer (depending on the nature of the industry affected and the knock-on effects it has on locally 
linked businesses). This would also provide more insight into the short and long term impacts of the 
strike.  
Many of the limitations which are listed above were discovered during the research which was 
conducted to explore certain results and how they came about. The study produced a number of results 
which were contrary to expectations, so these had to be further analysed through additional research. 
The limitations which were identified may have reduced the significance of the results in hindsight, 
however the correct conventional procedures and tests were used to assess the data so the results 
should be accurate within reason. 
5.3 Further Research 
Following on from the limitations, further research would be required to determine which industries 
are most affected by strikes. From the research done it is evident that the following areas would need 
to be explored: how the industry is linked to the international market, what tools are available in 
various industries that may offset or exacerbate the effects of strike action, whether the 
company/industry is more exposed to the international market through imports or exports, which 
unions are the most aggressive, and how dependent the consumers are with regard to the 
product/service being withheld. These studies should focus on the short and long term impacts of a 
strike, as well as the time frames over which various effects manifest themselves i.e. how volatility 
manifests itself through the duration of the strike, how changes in the value of the Rand occur and 
what decisions drive the change, and the magnitude and duration with which knock-on effects affect 
other linked industries and businesses. Bhana (1997) has already suggested that volatility is most 
evident for short periods around the onset of strike action or violence. Constructing multiple dummy 
variables for specific periods (selected to coincide with certain events i.e. a death caused by striking 
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workers) within the strike may increase the accuracy of the results. Another factor worth investigating 
would be whether wildcat strikes had a greater impact on the volatility or value of the Rand than legal 
strikes. This would provide insight as to how volatility evolves over time, as well as whether the 
effects created by wildcat strikes are of a greater magnitude than those for planned strikes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
51 
 
References 
Abrahams, M. (2008) Saccawu: Call for Solidarity, Abahlali baseMjondolo [Online] Available: 
http://abahlali.org/node/4227/ [Accessed: 19 November 2014] 
Allix, M and Gernetzky, K. (2013) SA ‘will pay heavy price’ for automotive sector strike, Business 
Day [Online] Available: http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/labour/2013/08/20/sa-will-pay-heavy-
price-for-automotive-sector-strike [Accessed: 20 November 2014] 
Ampofu, S., Mac Quene, K., Ndlebe, A., van Niekerk, I., and Samson, M., (2003) The volatility of 
the rand and its impact on the manufacturing sector: the impact on exporters and investors, EPRI 
Research Paper #35, Economic Policy Research Institute, Cape Town 
Anderson, T., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F. and Labys, P. (2001) The Distribution of Realized Exchange 
Rate Volatility, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 96:453: 42-55 
Aron, J., Elbadawi, I. and Kahn, B. (1997) Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate in South Africa 
Working WPS/97-16. University of Oxford, United Kingdom 
Ashenfelter, O. and Johnson, G. (1969) Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike 
Activity, The American Economic Review, Volume 59, No. 1, pp. 35-49 
Asiedu, E. (2006) Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, 
government policy, institutions and political instability, United Nations University, Japan 
Balston, M., Burgess, R., Canonero, G., Giacomelli, D. and Spencer, M. (2012) South Africa: short-
term gains, long-term pains, Emerging Markets Monthly, November 2012, Deutsche Bank Global 
Markets Research 
Bhana, N. (1997) The effect of industrial strikes on the value of shares listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange: Investment Analysts Journal, No. 44 Summer 1997. University of Durban-Westville 
Becker, B. and Olsen, C. (1986) The impact of strikes on shareholder equity. International Labour 
Relations, 39(3): 425-438 
Bloom, N. (2009) The impact of uncertainty shocks Econometrica, Volume 77, No. 3 (May, 2009), 
623 - 685 
   
52 
 
Bodnar, G. and Gentry, W. (1993) Exchange rate exposure and industry characteristics: evidence 
from Canada, Japan, and the USA, Journal of International Money and Finance, 12, 29-45 
Bollerslev, T. (1986) Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Journal of 
Economics, Volume 31, 307 - 327 
Bollerslev, T. and M. Melvin (1994) Bid-Ask Spreads and Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market: 
An Empirical Analysis. Journal of International Economics, 36: 355-372 
Box, G. and Tiao, G (1975) Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental 
Problems, Journal of the American Statistical Association, Volume 70, No. 349 (March., 1975), 70-
79  
Brand, R. (2013) Rand Declines Second Day as Strike Concern Damps Investor Demand Bloomberg 
[Online] Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/rand-declines-second-day-as-
strike-concern-damps-investor-demand.html [Accessed: 19 February 2013] 
Brooks, C. (2001) A Double-threshold GARCH Model for the French Franc/Deutschmark Exchange 
Rate Journal of Forecasting No.20, 135-143  
Brooks, C. (2008) Introductory econometrics for finance (2e) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Burger, P. (2008) The changing volatility of the South African economy,  South African Journal of 
Economics, Volume 76, No.3, 335 - 355 
Burgess, R., Giacomelli, D. and Masia, D. (2012) South Africa: short-term gains, long-term pains, 
Deutsche Bank: Emerging Markets Monthly 
Business Day, (2014) Lonmin slashes sales forecasts in wake of strike, [Online], Available: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2014/07/28/lonmin-slashes-sales-forecasts-in-wake-of-
strike [Accessed 17 October 2014] 
Campbell, J., Lo, A. and Mackinlay, A. (1997) The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey 
   
53 
 
International Monetary Fund, (2003) Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries, 
[Online] Available: https://www.imf.org/external/np/cmcg/2003/eng/091803.pdf [Accessed 22 April 
2014] 
Carlson, J. and Osler, C. (1998) Rational Speculators and Exchange Rate Volatility, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, New York 
CEIC Data Blog (2013) Significant Impact from South African Mining Strikes [Online] Available: 
http://blog.securities.com/2013/01/significant-impact-from-south-african-mining-strikes/ [Accessed 
15 May 2013] 
Chaudhary, S. and Shrestha, M. (2013) The Economic Cost of General Strikes in Nepal, NRB 
Economic Review. National Religious Broadcasters, Washington 
Chinzara, Z. and Aziakpono, M.J. (2009) Dynamic Returns Linkages and Volatility Transmission 
between South African and World Major Stock Markets, Working Paper Number 146. Rhodes 
University Department of Economics and Economic History, Grahamstown 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 [Online] Available: 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf [Accessed: 27 May 2013] 
City Press (2012) Truck drivers’ strike ends [Online] Available: 
http://www.citypress.co.za/news/truck-drivers-strike-ends-20121012/ [Accessed: 8 May 2013] 
Cramton, P. and Tracy, J. (1992) Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, 
American Economic Review, No. 82, .100-12  
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). (2014) September 2014 – Monthly Trade Partner Ranking 
[Online] Available: http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx [Accessed: 7 
November 2014] 
 De Wet, J. and Diale, G. (2013) To Strike or Not To Strike, Accountancy South Africa [Online] 
Available:http://www.accountancysa.org.za/resources/ShowItemArticle.asp?ArticleId=2580&Issue
=1123 [Accessed: 30 May 2013] 
Dimitrova, D. (2005) The relationship between Exchange Rates and Stock Prices: Studied in a 
multivariate model, Issues in Political Economy, August 2005, Volume 14  
   
54 
 
Dolamo, S. (2012) The Impact of Marikana on the Platinum Market, Investing in a low yield, low 
growth environment. Stanlib Standpoint, Volume 4 
Doukas, J., Hall, P. and Lang, L. (2003) Exchange Rate Exposure at the Firm and Industry 
Level. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, Volume 12, No. 5  
Downing, R. (2012) Rand weakens on continued strikes. BDLive [Online] Available:  
http://www.bdlive.co.za/markets/2012/11/02/rand-weakens-on-continued-strikes [Accessed 19 
February 2013] 
Economicshelp (2015) What causes an appreciation in the Exchange rate? [Online] Available: 
http://econ.economicshelp.org/2007/05/essay-what-causes-appreciation-in.html [Accessed 6 
February 2015] 
Enders, W. (2010) Applied Econometric Time Series (3e) Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons Inc, USA 
Equity Aviation (2014) Company details, [Online] Available: 
https://www.facebook.com/equityaviation/timeline [Accessed 28 October 2014] 
Etheridge, J. (2013) We are calling the farmworkers' strike off. Mail and Guardian [Online] Available: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-22-cosatu-farmworkers-strike-called-off [Accessed: 8 May 2013] 
Fang, W. and Miller, S (2009) Modelling the Volatility of Real GDP Growth: The Case of Japan 
Revisited, [Online] Available: http://web.unlv.edu/projects/RePEc/pdf/0904.pdf [Accessed: 19 July 
2015] 
Fedderke, J. and Romm, A. (2006) Growth impact and determinants of foreign direct investment into 
South Africa, 1956–2003 Economic Modelling, Volume 23, 738–760  
Fedderke, J. and Schaling, E. (2005) Modelling inflation in South Africa: A multivariate cointegration 
analysis, South African Journal of Economics, March 2005, Volume 73, Issue 1, 79-92 
Fin24. (2013a) Rand near 3 week lows on strike fears. Available: 
http://www.fin24.com/Markets/Currencies/Rand-near-3-week-lows-on-strike-fears-20130514 
[Accessed: 14May 2013] 
   
55 
 
Fin24. (2013b) Rand weaker on fundamentals Available: 
http://www.fin24.com/Markets/Currencies/Rand-weaker-on-fundamentals-20130513  [Accessed: 14 
May 2013] 
Gleditsch, K. and Maestas, C. (1998) Sensitivity of GARCH Estimates: Effects of Model Specification 
on Estimates of Macropartisan Volatility, University of Colorado, Colarado 
Howells, P and Bain, K. (2008) The economics of money, banking and finance, Pearson Education 
Ltd, England 
International Trade Centre (2010) Understanding Cotton Demand and Promoting Origin – The 
Example of African Cotton, [Online] Available: 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracen.org/Content/Exporters/Sectoral_Information/Manuf
actured_Goods/Textiles/Understanding-Cotton-Demand-ed-clean.pdf [Accessed 23 November 
2014] 
Investopedia (2015) Purchasing Power Parity, [Online] Available: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ppp.asp [Accessed: 13 July 2015] 
Janse van Vuuren, A. (2013) Stuck between a rock and Amcu, FIN24 [Online] Available: 
http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/Stuck-between-a-rock-and-Amcu-20130224 [Accessed: 
25 February 2013] 
Jorian, P. (1991) The pricing of exchange rate risk in the stock market, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Volume 26, No. 3, 362-376 
JP Morgan (2009) Questioning the U.S. Dollar’s Status as a reserve Currency, JP Morgan Insights 
[Online] Available: https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1158630192140.pdf [Accessed: 7 November 
2014] 
Kaggwa, M. (2011) The complementary role of industrial and technology policy in job creation in 
South Africa’s automotive industry, AISA Policy Brief, No. 38, February 2011 
Khan, B. (2009) Challenges of inflation targeting for emerging-market economies: The South African 
case, [Online] Available: 
http://www2.resbank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/1375D655561CAD9E4225760100384B
88/$File/Brian+Kahn.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2013] 
   
56 
 
Koehler, D. and Hespenheide, E. (2013) Finding the Value in Environmental, Social, and Governance 
Performance: Deloitte Review, Issue 12 2013  
Lamoureux, C. and Lastrapes, W. (1990) Persistence in Variance, Structural Change, and the GARCH 
Model, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, April 1990, Vol. 8, No. 2.  
LiPuma, E. and Koelble, T. (2009) Currency devaluations and consolidating democracy: the example 
of the South African Rand, Economy and Society, Cape Town, South Africa 
Maboja, W. (2013) Mechanising mines in South Africa a double-edged sword. ABN Digital [Online] 
Available: http://www.abndigital.com/news/technology/2013/08/16/mechanising-mines-in-south-
africa-a-double-edged-sword [Accessed: 7 May 2014] 
Mail & Guardian (2013) SA’s economy struggling after motor strike [Online] Available: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-14-sa-economy-on-downward-slope [Accessed 3 October 2014] 
Marrian, N. (2012) Costly transport strike over, Business Day [Online] Available: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/labour/2012/10/12/costly-transport-strike-over [Accessed: 20 
November 2014] 
Maswanganyi, N. (2014) Manufacturing rallies but strikes will bite. Business Day Live [Online] 
Available: http://www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2014/08/08/manufacturing-rallies-but-strikes-will-bite 
[Accessed 3 October 2014] 
McConnell, S. (1989) Strikes, Wages, and Private Information, The American Economic Review, 
Volume 79, No. 4 (Sep), 801-815 
Media Club South Africa (2014) South Africa’s economy: key sectors, [Online] Available: 
http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/economy/37-economy/economy-bg/111-sa-economy-key-
sectors#mining [Accessed: 21 November 2014] 
Melvin, M. and Tan, K. (1996) Foreign Exchange Market Bid-Ask Spreads and the Market Price of 
Social Unrest. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Mining IQ (2014) Mining in South Africa, [Online] Available: http://www.projectsiq.co.za/mining-
in-south-africa.htm [Accessed: 27 October 2014] 
   
57 
 
Mishkin, F. (2007) The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, Pearson 
International, USA 
Mtonga, E. (2006) The real exchange rate of the rand and competitiveness of South Africa's trade, 
Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 1192.  
Mulholland, A., Clark, T., Masia, D. and Sporre, G. (2013) Wage Negotiations: A Winter of 
Discontent, Deutsche Bank Markets Research Industry Update: South African Resources, 10 May 
2013 
News24. (2012) Marikana conflict timeline, [Online], Available: 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Marikana-conflict-timeline-20121001     [Accessed 8 
May 2013] 
News24. (2013a) Rand weakens on Amplats Stay-away, [Online] Available: 
http://www.fin24.com/Markets/Currencies/Rand-weakens-on-Amplats-stayaway-20130219 
[Accessed: 19 February 2013] 
News24. (2013b) Rand struggles, R9.2/dollar in sight, [Online] Available: 
http://www.fin24.com/Markets/Currencies/Rand-struggles-R92dollar-in-sight-20130308 [Accessed: 
8 March 2013] 
OECD (2009) Responding to the Economic Crisis, OECD Publishing. [Online] Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/43387209.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2015] 
OECD (2013) OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2013, OECD Publishing. [Online] Available: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-zaf-2013-en [Accessed: 8 November 2013] 
Roelf, W. (2012) South Africa truckers sign wage deal, strike off, Reuters [Online] Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/12/us-safrica-strikes-trucks-idUSBRE89B07920121012 
[Accessed 8 May 2013] 
Scherer, F. (2013) No clear solutions for South African labour unrest in 2013 [Online] Available: 
http://www.politicalanalysis.co.za/2013/01/21/no-clear-solutions-for-south-african-labour-unrest-
in-2013/ [Accessed 8 May 2013] 
   
58 
 
Schroeder, F. (2006) Shops looted as security strike continues, IOL News [Online] Available: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/shops-looted-as-security-strike-continues-
1.274432#.VG7vaouUdqU [Accessed: 19 November 2014] 
Shilton, J. (2012) Miner’s strike adds to fears of South African economic downturn, [Online] 
Available: https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/09/safr-s26.html [Accessed 7 June 2013] 
Sidimba, L. (2014) Strikes cost SA workers over R11 billion, [Online] Available: 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/strikes-cost-sa-workers-over-r11-billion-1.1740011#.VWWdl8-
qqko [Accessed: 3 December 2014] 
South African Survey (2000) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2001) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2002) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2003) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2004) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2005) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2006) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2007) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2008) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2009) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2010) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2011) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Survey (2012) South African Institute of Race Relations, Andrew Levy, Johannesburg  
South African Reserve Bank. (2012a) Fact Sheet 2: Why Inflation is Bad, [Online] Available: 
http://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4996/Fact%20Sheet%2
02.pdf [Accessed: 13 February 2013] 
   
59 
 
South African Reserve Bank. (2012b) Fact Sheet 3: How to Fight Inflation, [Online] Available: 
http://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4997/Fact%20Sheet%2
03.pdf [Accessed: 13 February 2013] 
South African Reserve Bank. (2013) Economic and Financial Data for South Africa [Online] 
Available: http://wwwrs.resbank.co.za/webindicators/EconFinDataForSA.aspx [Accessed: 28 
August 2013] 
Sridharan, Sanjeev and Vujic, Suncica and Koopman, Siem Jan, Intervention Time Series Analysis 
of Crime Rates (2003) Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. 2003-040/4.  
Standard Bank. (2013) Exchange Rates, [Online] Available: 
http://ws9.standardbank.co.za/research/data/DMIS93.xls [Accessed: 13 February 2013] 
Stoddard, E. and Flak, A. (2012) South African wildcat strikes spread to more mines, [Online] 
Available: http://www.sacw.net/article2915.html [Accessed 13 May 2013] 
Teitelbaum, E and Robertson, G. (2008) Do Investors Flee or Fight? Examining the Relationship 
Between Labour Protest and Foreign Direct Investment, George Washington University [Online]. 
Available: http://www.gwu.edu/~igis/assets/docs/Teitelbaum%20Robertson_paper.pdf [Accessed: 
25 February 2013] 
Tharisa. (2014) Products and Markets: Chrome, [Online] Available: http://www.tharisa.com/prod-
chrome.php [Accessed: 25 October 2014] 
The Economist (2013) Crash Course, [Online] Available: 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-
five-years-article [Accessed 28 October 2014] 
Thomas White International (2011) Emerging Market Spotlight [Online] Available: 
file:///D:/emerging-markets-spotlight-south-africa-consumer-goods-july-2011.pdf [Accessed 21 
November 2014] 
Tswamuno, D., Pardee, S., and Wunnava, P. (2007) Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the South African Experience, International Journal of Applied Economics, 4(2), 
September 2007, 75-89 
   
60 
 
Visser, W. (2005) Strikes Around the World, 1968-2005. Case-studies of 15 Countries. Aksant 
Akademic Publishers, Amsterdam 
Western Union (2014) Currency Hedging, [Online] Available: 
http://business.westernunion.com/resource-center/fx-101/hedging/ [Accessed: 17 October 2014] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
61 
 
Figures and Graphs 
 
Figure 1: Current Account Deficit - % of GDP  Sourced from Porter (2013:4) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Supply and Demand for Labour   Sourced from Mishkin (2007:620) 
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Figure 3: ZAR/USD exchange rate (1995-2012) Sourced from Investec Wealth & Investment 
 
 
Figure 4: ZAR/USDollar exchange rate for 2012  Sourced from Standard Bank 
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Figure 5: Forex stationary at first difference 
Null Hypothesis: LOG_FOREXFD has a unit root                 
Exogenous: Constant              
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19)              
 
                                        t-Statistic          Prob.* 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.675602             0.0997 
Test critical values:    1% level         -3.432059     
                  5% level                -2.862181     
                    10% level               -2.567155     
 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.                
 
Figure 6: ADF stationarity results 
 
Table 1: Significant Strike Actions: Man-days lost in top Strikes  
Mandays lost in the top  four strikes, 2000 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 18-Sep NUM Amplats 110000 20 Wages 
2 15-Dec Satawu SEA 100000 12 Wages 
3 21-Feb TGWU RFEA 55000 1 Wages 
4 21-Jan Numsa Volkswagen South Africa 14300 11 Dismissal 
Sourced from South African Survey (2000) 
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Mandays lost in the top five strikes, 2001 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 06-Aug Numsa AMEO 315000 15 Wages 
3 13-Aug NUM  Northam Platinum 113400 21 Wages 
4 11-Oct Numsa Samancor 100000 20 Wages 
5 06-Aug Numsa NTMEA 75000 15 Wages 
6 24-Jul Numsa/NUM Eskom 60000 3 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2001) 
Mandays lost in the top four strikes, 2002 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 02-Jul Samwu Salga 700000 14 Wages 
2 16-May NUM Randfontein GM 50000 10 Wages 
3 20-May Fawu Simba 28000 40 Wages 
4 15-Jul Sactwu Team Puma 24000 80 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2002) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2003 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 23-Oct Saccawu Shoprite 300000 10 Wages 
2 17-Mar NUM Impala Platinum 180000 
10 
Grievanc
e 
3 27-May Numsa Iscor 75000 
15 
Grievanc
e 
4 08-Sep NUM Safsec 56000 8 Wages 
5 22-Sep Numsa Delta Motor 21000 
7 
Grievanc
e 
6 27-Oct Satawu ACSA 15000 15 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2003) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2004 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 16-Sep Sadtu 
Public Service and 
Administration 800000 
1 
Wages 
2 07-May Fawu Rainbow Chicken 93500 17 Wages 
3 
18 Dec 2003-2 
Jan 2004 Satawu Equity Aviation 63200 
79 
Wages 
4 26-Feb Satawu Contract Cleaning 42000 21 Wages 
5 30-Sep NUM Impala Platinum 30000 2 Wages 
6 11-Feb NUM Harmony GM 13500 3 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2004) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2005 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 08-Aug NUM Chamber of Mines 450000 5 Wages 
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2 26-Feb Satawu RFEA 300000 10 Wages 
3 12-Jul Samwu Salga 300000 3 Wages 
4 22-Jul Saccawu Pick ‘n Pay 220000 11 Wages 
5 23-Mar NUM Harmony GM 210000 
10 
Retrench
ment 
6 08-Aug Samwu Salga 150000 5 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2005) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2006 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 
23 March & 13 
April Satawu Sansea 
128000
0 
64 
Wages 
2 31-Jul Satawu NCCA 580000 29 Wages 
3 10-Aug Saccawu Shoprite Checkers 472190 46 Wages 
4 13-Mar Satawu Sansea 120000 2 Wages 
5 23-Feb Satawu Transnet 105000 
3 
Retrench
ment 
6 29-Sep Saccawu Sun International 66000 44 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2006) 
Mandays lost in the top five strikes, 2007 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 01-Jun Sadtu DPSA 
114000
00 
19 
Wages 
2 12-Sep Numsa Retail Motor Industry 320000 8 Wages 
3 04-Dec NUM  Mining Industry 240000 
1 
Grievanc
e 
4 09-Jul Numsa MEIBC 100000 5 Wages 
5 09-Jul Ceppwawu NPEA 90000 5 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2007) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2008 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 17-Sep Saccawu Woolworths 405000 27 Wages 
2 27-May Samwu 
Ekurhuleni Metro 
Council 119000 
17 
Wages 
3 22-Aug NUM Lonmin Platinum 100000 17 Wages 
4 05-May Samwu Tshwane Metro Council 76000 19 Wages 
5 October Samwu Joburg Metro Council 30000 3 Wages 
6 08-Oct NUM Pamodzi 22500 5 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2008) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2009 
  Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 15 & 28 Sept Sactwu NBCCMI 666000 18 Wages 
2 27-Jul Samwu 
South African local Govt 
Authority 500000 
5 
Wages 
   
66 
 
3 08-Jul NUM Safcec 490000 7 Wages 
4 07-Apr Satawu 
Road Freight Employer’s 
Association 420000 
7 
Wages 
5 20-Jul Ceppwawu 
Chemical Industry 
Bargaining Council 165000 
8 
Wages 
6 24-Aug NUM Impala Platinum 200000 10 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2009) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2010 
Ra
nk Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 29-Jul Sadtu DPSA 
120000
00 
15 
Wages 
2 12-Apr Samwu Salga 560000 7 Wages 
3 01-Sep Numsa Retail Motor Industry 550000 11 Wages 
4 10-May Satawu Transnet 500000 10 Wages 
5 11-Aug Numsa AMEO 256000 8 Wages 
6 05-Sep NUM  Northam Platinum 91800 17 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2010) 
Mandays lost in the top six strikes, 2011 
Rank Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 15-Aug Samwu Salga 
132000
0 
11 
Wages 
2 28-Jul Num Chamber of Mines 
125000
0 
5 
Wages 
3 04-Jul Numsa & Others MEIBC 
117000
0 
10 
Wages 
4 10-Jul Ceppwawu NBCCI 
105000
0 
15 
Wages 
5 08-Aug 
Satawu, Hotellica 
& Others NCCA 400000 
20 
Wages 
6 13-Feb Satawu  
Road Freight Employer’s 
Association 224000 
7 
Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2011) 
Mandays lost in the top ten strikes, 2012 
Rank Date Union Company/Industry 
Man-
days 
Duration 
(days) Trigger 
1 20-Sep Worker led Anglo Gold Ashanti 700000 28 Wages 
2 13-Sep Worker led Anglo Platinum 516000 43 Wages 
3 20-Jan NUM Impala Platinum 447200 26 Wages 
4 25-Sep Worker led Goldfields KDC West Mine 362500 29 Wages 
5 27-Aug Worker led Agri SA 306500 34 Wages 
6 25-Sep Satawu 
Road Freight Employer’s 
Association 100000 
5 
Wages 
7 01-Oct Worker led Bokoni Platinum 100000 50 Wages 
8 03-Oct Worker led Harmony Gold Mine 97200 18 Wages 
9 14-Oct Worker led Goldfields KDC East Mine 87500 7 Wages 
10 10-Aug Worker led Lonmin Platinum 87000 29 Wages 
Sourced from South African Survey (2012) 
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Table 2: GARCH Results: Strike Specific 
Date Company Man-Days Duration Coefficient ARCH GARCH Probability Year 
21 Jan VW SA 14300 11 0.0148 0.0777 0.9093 0.5565 2000 
21 Feb Road Freight Employers 55000 1 -0.3809 0.0780 0.9074 0.0039 2000 
18 Sept Amplats 110000 20 -0.0010 0.0779 0.9086 0.9743 2000 
15 Dec SEA 100000 12 0.0025 0.0778 0.9087 0.9308 2000 
24 July Eskom 60000 3 -0.1290 0.0765 0.9086 0.0110 2001 
6 Aug Ameo 315000 15 -0.0257 0.0779 0.9067 0.0234 2001 
13 Aug Northam Platinum 113400 21 -0.0272 0.0805 0.9023 0.0034 2001 
11 Oct Samancor 100000 20 0.1762 0.0703 0.9178 0.0047 2001 
16 May Randfontein Gold Mine 50000 10 *0.0234 0.0780 0.9085 0.7635 
 
2002 
20-May Simba 28000 40 0.0067 0.0777 0.9087 0.8076 2002 
02-Jul Salga 700000 14 -0.0123 0.0780 0.9084 0.7408 2002 
15-Jul Team Puma 24000 80 -0.0002 0.0778 0.9909 0.9831 2002 
17-Mar Impala Platinum 180000 10 0.0821 0.0769 0.9096 0.4234 2003 
27-May Iscor 75000 15 0.0065 0.0779 0.9085 0.9467 2003 
08-Sep Safsec 56000 8 0.0027 0.0778 0.9087 0.9811 2003 
22-Sep Delta Motor 21000 7 0.0738 0.0779 0.9084 0.5793 2003 
23-Oct Shoprite 300000 10 -0.0264 0.0784 0.9080 0.6219 2003 
27-Oct Airports Company South Africa 15000 15 0.0268 0.0774 0.9092 0.5632 2003 
18Dec- 2 
Jan 
Equity Aviation 63200 79 0.5506 0.0749 0.9094 0.0469 2003 – 
2004 
11-Feb Harmony GM 13500 3 0.0329 0.0779 0.9085 0.9492 2004 
26-Feb Contract Cleaning 42000 21 0.0632 0.0786 0.9071 0.5014 2004 
07-May Rainbow Chicken 93500 17 -0.0701 0.0773 0.9099 0.2183 2004 
16-Sep Public Service and Admin 800000 1 -0.7368 0.0764 0.9101 0.0000 2004 
30-Sep Impala Platinum 30000 2 -0.1768 0.0789 0.9068 0.1887 2004 
26-Feb Road Freight Employer's 
Association 
300000 10 0.1289 0.0770 0.9093 0.2803 2005 
23-Mar Harmony GM 210000 10 0.0849 0.0778 0.9084 0.5498 2005 
12-Jul Salga 300000 3 -0.1788 0.0768 0.9104 0.5341 2005 
22-Jul Pick 'n Pay 220000 11 -0.1050 0.0758 0.9114 0.0383 2005 
08-Aug Chamber of Mines 450000 5 -0.0898 0.0766 0.9102 0.1820 2005 
23-Feb Transnet 105000 3 0.0376 0.0778 0.9088 0.7619 2006 
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13-Mar Sansea 120000 2 0.1380 0.0773 0.9094 0.7239 2006 
23 March 
& 13 April 
Sansea 1280000 64 -0.1689 0.0791 0.9070 0.5837 2006 
    0.0869 0.0781 0.9065 0.0020 2006 
31-Jul NCCA 580000 29 0.0326 0.0783 0.9077 0.3281 2006 
10-Aug Shoprite Checkers 472190 46 0.0465 0.0792 0.9059 0.1420 2006 
29-Sep Sun International 66000 44 -0.0199 0.0774 0.9097 0.4365 2006 
01-Jun DPSA 11400000 19 -0.0051 0.0779 0.9085 0.8635 2007 
09-Jul MEIBC 100000 5 0.0179 0.0776 0.9091 0.8069 2007 
12-Sep Retail Motor Industry 320000 8 -0.0608 0.0783 0.9079 0.1812 2007 
04-Dec Mining Industry 240000 1 -0.9845 0.0787 0.9078 0.0165 2007 
05-May Tshwane Metro Council 76000 19 -0.0242 0.0770 0.9098 0.4514 2008 
27-May Ekurhuleni Metro Council 119000 17 -0.0148 0.0777 0.9088 0.7129 2008 
22-Aug Lonmin Platinum 100000 17 0.1860 0.0712 0.9157 0.1541 2008 
17-Sep Woolworths 405000 27 0.5354 0.0682 0.9161 0.0022 2008 
08-Oct Pamodzi 22500 5 4.0004 0.0704 0.9132 0.0262 2008 
07-Apr Road Freight Employer's 
Association 
420000 7 -0.0495 0.0778 0.9089 0.8842 2009 
08-Jul Safsec 490000 7 0.0565 0.0778 0.9085 0.8191 2009 
20-Jul Chemical Industry Bargaining 
Council 
165000 8 0.0555 0.0779 0.9084 0.7268 2009 
27-Jul South African local Govt 
Authority 
500000 5 0.0602 0.0778 0.9085 0.8136 2009 
24-Aug Impala Platinum 200000 10 -0.0247 0.0780 0.9086 0.8373 2009 
15 & 28 
Sept 
NBCCMI 666000 18 0.0603 0.0779 0.9081 0.4809 2009 
12-Apr Salga 560000 7 0.0761 0.0761 0.9108 0.5232 2010 
10-May Transnet 500000 10 0.0730 0.0780 0.9081 0.6678 2010 
29-Jul DPSA 12000000 15 -0.0223 0.0774 0.9090 0.4402 2010 
11-Aug AMEO 256000 8 -0.0191 0.0775 0.9090 0.6409 2010 
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01-Sep Retail Motor Industry 550000 11 -0.0582 0.0783 0.9072 0.0309 2010 
05-Sep Northam Platinum 91800 17 -0.0272 0.0783 0.9073 0.1408 2010 
13-Feb Road Freight Employer's 
Association 
224000 7 0.0124 0.0779 0.9087 0.8826 2011 
04-Jul MEIBC 1170000 10 0.0690 0.0772 0.9095 0.3618 2011 
10-Jul NBCCI 1050000 15 0.0811 0.0770 0.9095 0.3089 2011 
28-Jul Chamber of Mines 1250000 5 0.1699 0.0770 0.9095 0.3903 2011 
08-Aug NCCA 400000 20 -0.0008 0.0779 0.9086 0.9850 2011 
15-Aug Salga 1320000 11 -0.0269 0.0785 0.9079 0.6440 2011 
20-Jan Impala Platinum 447200 26 -0.0101 0.0775 0.9090 0.6351 2012 
10-Aug Lonmin Platinum 87000 29 0.0107 0.0777 0.9090 0.6231 2012 
27-Aug Agri SA 306500 34 0.0193 0.0782 0.9082 0.4645 2012 
13-Sep Anglo Platinum 516000 43 -0.0162 0.0768 0.9102 0.3432 2012 
20-Sep Anglo Gold Ashanti 700000 28 -0.0197 0.0771 0.9098 0.4142 2012 
25-Sep Goldfields KDC West Mine 362500 29 0.0134 0.0778 0.9086 0.9152 2012 
25-Sep Road Freight Employer's 
Association 
100000 5 -0.0178 0.0769 0.9101 0.4211 2012 
01-Oct Bokoni Platinum 100000 50 -0.0241 0.0757 0.9109 0.0151 2012 
03-Oct Harmony Gold Mine 97200 18 -0.0407 0.0765 0.9106 0.2321 2012 
14-Oct Goldfields KDC East Mine 87500 7 -0.0874 0.0764 0.9107 0.1497 2012 
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Table 3: GARCH dummy variables showing an increase in volatility 
 
Table 5: Intervention Analysis Results: Strike Specific 
Intervention Analysis Results 
Dummy/Strike Date 
Start 
Strike Coefficien
t 
AR(5) AR(7) Std. 
Error 
T-
Statisti
c 
Prob. Long Run 
Mean 
21_JANUARY_2000 Volkswagen South 
Africa 
0.1728 -0.0476 0.0490 0.3443 0.5020 0.6157 0.1731 
21_FEBRUARY_2000 Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
0.0923 -0.0475 0.0490 1.1475 0.0804 0.9359 0.0924 
18_SEPTEMBER_2000 Amplats 0.2110 -0.0476 0.0488 0.2567 0.8218 0.4113 0.2112 
Table: Increased Volatility of Exchange Rate 
Date Company Industry Man-days Days Trigger Coefficient ARCH GARCH Prob   Year 
08-
Oct 
Pamodzi Mining 
          
22,500  
5 Wages 4.0004 0.0704 0.9132 0.0262 2008 
18 
Dec 
2003- 
2 Jan 
2004 
Equity 
Aviation 
Transport 
          
63,200  
79 Wages 0.5506 0.0749 0.9094 0.0469 2003 
17-
Sep 
Woolworths Retail 
        
405,000  
27 Wages 0.5354 0.0682 0.9161 0.0022 2008 
11-
Oct 
Samancor Mining 
        
100,000  
20 Wages 0.1762 0.0703 0.9178 0.0047 2001 
24 
Marc
h & 
13 
April 
Sansea Security 
     
1,280,000  
64 Wages 0.0869 0.0781 0.9065 0.0020 2006 
           
Table 4: GARCH dummy variables showing a decrease in volatility 
Table: Decreased Volatility of Exchange Rate 
Date 
Company/Ind
ustry 
Industry Man-days Days Trigger Coefficient ARCH GARCH Prob  Year 
04-
Dec 
Mining 
Industry 
Mining 
        
240,000  
1 
Grievan
ce 
-0.9845 0.0787 0.9078 0.0165 2007 
16-
Sep 
Public Service 
and 
Administratio
n 
Education 
        
800,000  
1 Wages -0.7368 0.0764 0.9101 0.0000 2004 
21-
Feb 
Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
Transport 
          
55,000  
1 Wages -0.3809 0.0780 0.9074 0.0039 2000 
24-Jul Eskom Power 
          
60,000  
3 Wages -0.1290 0.0765 0.9086 0.0110 2001 
22-Jul Pick 'n Pay Retail 
        
220,000  
11 Wages -0.1050 0.0758 0.9114 0.0383 2005 
01-
Sep 
Retail Motor 
Industry 
Automotive 
        
550,000  
11 Wages -0.0582 0.0783 0.9072 0.0309 2010 
13-
Aug 
Northam 
Platinum 
Mining 
        
113,400  
21 Wages -0.0272 0.0805 0.9023 0.0034 2001 
06-
Aug 
AMEO Automotive 
        
315,000  
15 Wages -0.0257 0.0779 0.9067 0.0234 2001 
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15_DECEMBER_2000 SEA 0.0110 -0.0475 0.0491 0.3301 0.0333 0.9734 0.0110 
24_JULY_2001 Eskom -0.1007 -0.0475 0.0491 0.6631 -0.1519 0.8793 -0.1009 
6_AUGUST_2001 AMEO 0.0934 -0.0475 0.0490 0.2958 0.3158 0.7522 0.0935 
13_AUGUST_2001 Northam Platinum 0.1133 -0.0476 0.0490 0.2507 0.4521 0.6512 0.1135 
1_OCTOBER_2001 Samancor 0.0696 -0.0475 0.0490 0.2634 0.2643 0.7916 0.0697 
16_MAY_2002 Randfontein GM -0.3563 -0.0477 0.0486 0.3606 -0.9880 0.3232 -0.3566 
20_MAY_2002 Simba -0.0345 -0.0475 0.0491 0.1826 -0.1888 0.8503 -0.0345 
2_JULY_2002 Salga -0.2196 -0.0475 0.0491 0.3060 -0.7176 0.4730 -0.2199 
15_JULY_2002 Team Puma -0.0405 -0.0475 0.0490 0.1301 -0.3111 0.7558 -0.0405 
17_MARCH_2003 Impala Platinum -0.2871 -0.0474 0.0493 0.3608 -0.7958 0.4262 -0.2877 
27_MAY_2003 Iscor -0.0813 -0.0474 0.0491 0.2960 -0.2747 0.7836 -0.0814 
8_SEPTEMBER_2003 Safsec 0.1936 -0.0474 0.0492 0.4021 0.4816 0.6301 0.1940 
22_SEPTEMBER_2003 Delta Motor -0.8402 -0.0485 0.0486 0.4286 -1.9603 0.0500 -0.8403 
23_OCTOBER_2003 Shoprite -0.3491 -0.0474 0.0489 0.3606 -0.9680 0.3331 -0.3496 
27_OCTOBER_2003 Airports Company 
South Africa 
-0.2374 -0.0477 0.0488 0.2957 -0.8029 0.4221 -0.2377 
18_DECEMBER_2003 Equity Aviation 0.4032 -0.0474 0.0484 0.2865 1.4072 0.1595 0.4036 
11_FEBRUARY_2004 Harmony GM -1.4517 -0.0470 0.0484 0.6629 -2.1901 0.0286 -1.4538 
26_FEBRUARY_2004 Contract Cleaning 0.0126 -0.0475 0.0491 0.2568 0.0492 0.9607 0.0127 
7_MAY_2004 Rainbow Chicken -0.2954 -0.0479 0.0492 0.2781 -1.0623 0.2882 -0.2958 
16_SEPTEMBER_2004 Public Service and 
Administration 
0.2856 -0.0475 0.0491 1.1472 0.2490 0.8034 0.2861 
30_SEPTEMBER_2004 Impala Platinum 0.1495 -0.0475 0.0491 0.8114 0.1843 0.8538 0.1498 
25_FEBRUARY_2005 Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
-0.1155 -0.0474 0.0491 0.3607 -0.3202 0.7489 -0.1157 
23_MARCH_2005 Harmony GM -0.0239 -0.0474 0.0491 0.3801 -0.0628 0.9500 -0.0239 
12_JULY_2005 Salga -0.9355 -0.0477 0.0497 0.6630 -1.4109 0.1584 -0.9374 
22_JULY_2005 Pick 'n Pay -0.1599 -0.0476 0.0490 0.3797 -0.4212 0.6736 -0.1601 
8_AUGUST_2005 Chamber of Mines -0.0370 -0.0475 0.0490 0.5143 -0.0720 0.9426 -0.0371 
23_FEBRUARY_2006 Transnet 0.2443 -0.0475 0.0491 0.6631 0.3684 0.7126 0.2447 
13_MARCH_2006 Sansea 0.1477 -0.0477 0.0491 0.8117 0.1819 0.8557 0.1479 
23_MARCH_2006 Sansea -0.3579 -0.0477 0.0489 0.8113 -0.4411 0.6592 -0.3583 
13_APRIL_2006 Sansea 0.2408 -0.0483 0.0484 0.1437 1.6754 0.0939 0.2408 
31_JULY_2006 NCCA 0.2398 -0.0476 0.0491 0.2104 1.1397 0.2545 0.2401 
10_AUGUST_2006 Shoprite Checkers 0.1905 -0.0479 0.0484 0.1685 1.1305 0.2584 0.1906 
29_SEPTEMBER_2006 Sun International -0.1519 -0.0478 0.0488 0.1723 -0.8819 0.3779 -0.1521 
1_JUNE_2007 DPSA -0.0061 -0.0475 0.0491 0.2705 -0.0225 0.9821 -0.0061 
9_JULY_2007 MEIBC -0.1920 -0.0476 0.0488 0.5142 -0.3735 0.7088 -0.1923 
12_SEPTEMBER_2007 Retail Motor Industry -0.3416 -0.0478 0.0490 0.4020 -0.8498 0.3955 -0.3420 
4_DECEMBER_2007 Mining Industry -0.1452 -0.0474 0.0491 1.1485 -0.1264 0.8994 -0.1454 
5_MAY_2008 Tshwane Metro 
Council 
-0.0206 -0.0475 0.0491 0.2568 -0.0801 0.9362 -0.0206 
27_MAY_2008 Ekurhuleni Metro 
Council 
0.1748 -0.0477 0.0490 0.2704 0.6462 0.5182 0.1750 
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22_AUGUST_2008 Lonmin Platinum 0.3138 -0.0475 0.0487 0.2704 1.1604 0.2460 0.3142 
17_SEPTEMBER_2008 Woolworths 1.1344 -0.0517 0.0446 0.2153 5.2685 0.0000 1.1264 
8_OCTOBER_2008 Pamodzi 0.3239 -0.0488 0.0479 0.5148 0.6293 0.5292 0.3236 
7_APRIL_2009 Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
-0.1399 -0.0477 0.0487 0.4293 -0.3259 0.7445 -0.1401 
9_JULY_2009 Safsec 0.4554 -0.0474 0.0496 0.4658 0.9777 0.3283 0.4564 
20_JULY_2009 Chemical Industry 
Bargaining Council 
-0.3347 -0.0475 0.0493 0.4021 -0.8325 0.4052 -0.3353 
27_JULY_2009 South African local 
Govt Authority 
0.2476 -0.0474 0.0491 0.5146 0.4811 0.6305 0.2480 
24_AUGUST_2009 Impala Platinum -0.2625 -0.0477 0.0485 0.3607 -0.7279 0.4667 -0.2627 
15_SEPTEMBER_2009 NBCCMI -0.0741 -0.0475 0.0490 0.2705 -0.2739 0.7842 -0.0742 
12_APRIL_2010 Salga 0.3684 -0.0475 0.0494 0.4289 0.8590 0.3904 0.3691 
10_MAY_2010 Transnet 0.2526 -0.0475 0.0489 0.3606 0.7003 0.4838 0.2529 
29_JULY_2010 DPSA -0.0847 -0.0475 0.0490 0.3060 -0.2769 0.7819 -0.0849 
11_AUGUST_2010 AMEO 0.1140 -0.0475 0.0491 0.4021 0.2836 0.7768 0.1142 
1_SEPTEMBER_2010 Retail Motor Industry -0.3580 -0.0477 0.0488 0.3442 -1.0403 0.2983 -0.3584 
6_SEPTEMBER_2010 Northam Platinum -0.2429 -0.0477 0.0487 0.2865 -0.8479 0.3966 -0.2431 
13_FEBRUARY_2011 Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
-0.2862 -0.0476 0.0489 0.4021 -0.7118 0.4766 -0.2866 
4_JULY_2011 MEIBC 0.1887 -0.0473 0.0492 0.3608 0.5230 0.6010 0.1890 
11_JULY_2011 NBCCI 0.0534 -0.0475 0.0490 0.2958 0.1806 0.8567 0.0535 
28_JULY_2011 Chamber of Mines 0.3971 -0.0476 0.0490 0.5143 0.7721 0.4401 0.3976 
8_AUGUST_2011 NCCA 0.0674 -0.0476 0.0489 0.2569 0.2623 0.7931 0.0675 
15_AUGUST_2011 Salga -0.1962 -0.0473 0.0493 0.3446 -0.5692 0.5693 -0.1966 
20_JANUARY_2012 Impala Platinum -0.1822 -0.0477 0.0489 0.2215 -0.8225 0.4109 -0.1824 
10_AUGUST_2012 Lonmin Platinum -0.0109 -0.0475 0.0491 0.2139 -0.0511 0.9592 -0.0110 
27_AUGUST_2012 Agri SA 0.1106 -0.0476 0.0490 0.1950 0.5672 0.5706 0.1108 
13_SEPTEMBER_2012 Anglo Platinum 0.1484 -0.0476 0.0489 0.1742 0.8519 0.3943 0.1486 
20_SEPTEMBER_2012 Anglo Gold Ashanti 0.1640 -0.0477 0.0489 0.2138 0.7671 0.4431 0.1642 
25_SEPTEMBER_2012 Goldfields KDC West 
Mine 
0.1861 -0.0477 0.0489 0.2103 0.8851 0.3762 0.1864 
25_SEPTEMBER_2012_ Road Freight 
Employer's 
Association 
0.0264 -0.0475 0.0490 0.5141 0.0514 0.9590 0.0265 
1_OCTOBER_2012 Bokoni Platinum 0.0951 -0.0475 0.0491 0.1621 0.5869 0.5573 0.0953 
3_OCTOBER_2012 Harmony Gold Mine 0.1987 -0.0475 0.0491 0.2634 0.7545 0.4506 0.1990 
14_OCTOBER_2012 Goldfields KDC East 
Mine 
0.1285 -0.0475 0.0489 0.3798 0.3383 0.7352 0.1287 
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Table 6: Significant Intervention Analysis dummy variables 
Significant Intervention Analysis Results 
Variable Coefficient AR(5) AR(7) 
Std. 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
Prob.   
Long 
Run 
Mean 
22_SEPTEMBER_2003 -0.840178 -0.048506 0.048592 0.428597 -1.9603 0.0500 -0.84025 
11_FEBRUARY_2004 -1.45173 -0.046962 0.048356 0.662853 -2.190125 0.0286 -1.45376 
13_APRIL_2006 0.240779 -0.048263 0.048442 0.143714 1.675407 0.0939 0.240822 
17_SEPTEMBER_2008 1.134441 -0.051739 0.044642 0.215327 5.268464 0.0000 1.126447 
 
Table 7: Industry Results 
Industry GARCH Results 
Industry Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   RESID(-1)^2 GARCH(-1) 
AUTOMOTIVE -0.0154 0.0095 -1.6239 0.1044 0.0781 0.9066 
EDUCATION -0.0136 0.0203 -0.6706 0.5025 0.0777 0.9085 
MINING -0.0137 0.0082 -1.6654 0.0958 0.0803 0.9048 
RETAIL 0.0167 0.0150 1.1116 0.2663 0.0775 0.9078 
PUBLIC -0.0140 0.0198 -0.7068 0.4797 0.0784 0.9080 
TRANSPORT 0.0510 0.0267 1.9119 0.0559 0.0759 0.9103 
TEXTILES 0.0036 0.0112 0.3244 0.7457 0.0779 0.9085 
       
Industry Intervention Analysis 
Industry Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. AR(5) AR(7) 
EDUCATION -0.0309 0.2001 -0.1543 0.8774 -0.0475 0.0490 
TEXTILES -0.0472 0.1177 -0.4008 0.6886 -0.0475 0.0490 
TRANSPORT 0.0238 0.1239 0.1918 0.8479 -0.0475 0.0491 
PUBLIC -0.0005 0.1345 -0.0034 0.9973 -0.0475 0.0491 
RETAIL 0.1361 0.0868 1.5669 0.1172 -0.0476 0.0484 
MINING -0.0061 0.0723 -0.0847 0.9325 -0.0474 0.0491 
AUTOMOTIVE -0.1276 0.1533 -0.8325 0.4052 -0.0477 0.0489 
 
 
 
